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Historically, the US has developed new partnerships to confront new challenges. With a 
growing China, the US may foster new partnerships to maintain a dominate position in 
East Asia. To understand how new partnerships may benefit the US, the study examined 
what benefits previous allies have provided and the timing of that benefit exchange. The 
study borrowed the literature’s Asymmetric Benefit Exchange Model and used four 
proxy measures to detect the provision of economic or political benefits to the US in the 
years surrounding an alliance declaration. I hypothesize that small states deliver 
political and economic benefits upfront to increase their chances of being selected as an 
ally but then pull back the delivery of these benefits following an alliance declaration to 
reduce their costs. 
 
The study identified one case, Argentina, in which the state delivered benefits prior to 
the alliance only to withdraw them once it was declared. The majority of cases, however, 
appear to have been selected without delivering economic or political benefits to the US, 
calling into question the applicability of the Asymmetric Benefit Exchange Model to the 
US alliance selection process. Indeed, the majority of allies appear to deliver their 
benefits in other ways, mostly through security provision or tailored political and 
economic benefits. The lessons learned in the study are then used to evaluate India as a 





security threat and India’s increasingly cooperative with the US at the UN, deepening 
trade relationship with the US, and increased purchases of US weapons.  
 
I was advised by Dr. Jennifer Bachner, Dr. Benjamin Ginsberg, and Dr. Alexander 
Rosenthal through the course of this thesis. The thesis was read by Dr. Leila Austin and 
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The United States faces growing challenges around the world, particularly given the rise 
of China. In the past when faced with a challenger, the US has developed alliances with 
local partners in order to boost partner military capabilities. For US policymakers 
considering candidate allies, the academic literature on alliances is of limited value. The 
bulk of the literature focuses on alliances between major powers as, in the realist-
conceptualization, major powers are the only true actors. However, given the power of 
the United States in the international system, US partners are significantly weaker.  
 
The narrow segment of literature focusing on asymmetric alliances theorizes that an 
asymmetry of power results in an asymmetric exchange of benefits. As a weak state has 
a relative deficit of security it will seek to capture the relative surplus of security which 
large states have. In exchange, a weak state’s relative surplus of political or economic 
freedom is provided to the larger power.  
 
This paper seeks to understand if this benefit exchange takes place in existing US 
alliances, the form and timing of these benefits, and whether lessons learned from this 
analysis can provide insight into prospective US alliances. To do so, I first I conduct a 
review of the existing literature on state behavior and the nature of alliances. Second, I 





these issues. Third, I identify cases for the study. Ultimately, I select the fourteen 
partners designated as Major Non-NATO Allies by the US Government. These cases 
help control the nature of the security benefits provided by the US as each MNNA is 
provided access to the same potential benefits due to the designation.  
 
With the cases selected, I then lay out the development of four proxy measures to 
represent the behavior of MNNAs. The first two proxies - US-MNNA UN voting affinity 
and trade relations between the MNNA and states under unilateral US sanctions - 
represent avenues through which political benefits can be delivered to the US by the 
MNNA. The latter two proxies, US-MNNA trade and US-MNNA arms trade, represent 
avenues through which economic benefits can be delivered to the US by the MNNA.  
 
With these proxies, I study the relationship between the US and each MNNA temporally 
relative to the year the partner was designated an MNNA. I do this by studying each 
MNNA’s behavior in three separate time periods. The first time period covers the five to 
ten years prior to the MNNA declaration. This time period acts as a baseline from which 
later behavior can be compared to. The second time period covers the five years prior to 
the designation. As five years is approximately the average length of a US Presidency, 
the second time period captures if the MNNA was starting to provide benefits to the US 
in the run up to its designation. The final time period is the five years after the 







Insights developed by the study are then applied in an examination of India, a 
prospective partner. In this section, I argue that China is a shared concern for the US and 
India by conducting a geospatial analysis of Chinese installations in the South China 
Sea. Through an analysis of Google search trends, I find that there is a growing interest 
in the topic, providing a catalyst for sustained US focus on the South China Sea. Shared 
concerns and sustained US policymaker interest provides the basis for studying this 
potential alliance. Finally, I review India’s behavior over the past decade as captured by 







Chapter One: Addressing the Literature’s Shortcomings 
Previous Research 
 
Alliance formation between polities has been a constant in international relations. In The 
History of the Peloponnesian Wars, for instance, Thucydides writes of the centrality of 
alliance networks amongst the Greek city-sates in the course of the conflict. Despite this 
ancient evidence, robust study of alliances did not come to the fore until after WWII. 
Developed in the post-war environment, the foundational thinking on alliances was 
heavily influenced by the conflict which was characterized by a clash of two Great 
Power alliance networks. As a result, the initial literature – dominated by the Realist 
School – concentrates on the interaction of Great Powers. 
 
For Realist thinkers, alliance formation is driven by a state’s overwhelming desire for 
security. The lack of a supreme authority in the international system creates an anarchic 
environment. Within this setting, states face pervasive security challenges as no external 
power exists to guarantee safety. As a result, alliances are created to enhance state 
security against immediate threats.1 Realists expect alliances to be short lived, however, 
as after the threat has passed, states will avoid assisting a potential future enemy: their 
current alliance partner.2  
 
                                               
1. Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security, 9,  No. 4 
(Spring 1985): 33 
2. Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security, 18,  No. 2 





Theorists from the Liberal School, by contrast, argue that states are typically confronted 
by competing priorities for government resources. The provision of security is just one 
of many state functions requiring attention. As security is a less dominate concern, states 
tend to be less suspicious of partnerships. As a result, Liberal thinkers generally believe 
that states seek to bolster trust within international relations by creating avenues for 
cooperation, including alliances. By doing so, states reduce the level of anarchy within 
their environment. 3  Furthermore, while alliances may be created to confront a specific 
threat, they often outlive their original purposes. Liberals argue that this phenomenon is 
due to the stickiness of institutions: with substantial gains derived from cooperation, 
relationships are cheaper to maintain than dissolve.4  
 
The Nature of Alliances 
 
For Realists such as Snyder and Walt, the anarchic nature of the international system 
creates a security dilemma for states. Unlike domestic systems, the international realm 
lacks a supreme authority to enforce rules. Therefore, states are left to fend for their own 
security. To bolster their prospects of survival, states band together against common 
threats. A state’s perception of these threats is strongly shaped by the distribution of 
                                               
3. Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” World Politics, 38, No. 
1 (Oct., 1985): 253. 
4. G. John Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” 





power within the international system with multipolar, bipolar, and unipolar systems 
expanding or limiting the number of viable partners.5  
 
However, no matter the distribution of power, states’ actions will be in reaction to their 
primary threats. For Walt, balancing is the most likely course of action as bandwagoning 
leaves a state at the mercy of their greatest threat. Bandwagoning is mostly seen as a 
choice for weak states on the periphery of major powers. As only major powers are 
relevant in the international system, minor powers that have a tendency to bandwagon 
simply “don’t matter”.6 Snyder’s work further reinforces this Realist worldview as he 
argues that threat perceptions drive alliance creation while ideological considerations 
play a secondary role.7 
 
Realism’s emphasis on the centrality of major powers in the international system led to 
the development of the Capability Aggregation Model to explain symmetric alliances 
between two major powers. This model assumes that security is the primary concern of 
states and that states use alliances to enhance their security by aggregating their 
capabilities with select partners against common threats. The resulting relationships are 
directed against the common threat and will quickly dissolve when the threat 
diminishes. The model examines symmetric alliances as only other major powers have 
sufficient capabilities to adequately contribute to common security. As a result, minor 
                                               
5. Stephen Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics, 61, No. 1 (Jan., 2009): 86-120. 
6. Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security, 9, No. 4 
(Spring 1985): 3-43. 






powers are essentially locked out of forming a relationship with a major power because 
the minor power has little capability to enhance an alliance’s overall security.8  
 
Realism’s focus on major powers undermines its ability to address why major powers 
still choose to ally with minor powers despite the latter’s weak security capabilities. This 
shortfall reduces the model’s utility for US policymakers as America's power and size 
ensures that all potential allies will be relatively small. In addition, empirical research 
indicates that the majority of alliances since the 15th Century included at least one minor 
power.9 This presents a quandary: if Realism is correct in its assessment that minor 
powers have little strategic importance, why are the majority of alliances formed with 
them?  
 
To address this theoretical shortcoming, the literature expanded beyond Realist 
orthodoxy. Liberalism, for instance, argues that these relationships exist because 
policymakers successfully linked security and other concerns. While Realism views state 
survival as an overwhelming concern of states in an anarchic system, Liberalism argues 
that states also have economic and political concerns. Morrow, for instance, argues that 
states simultaneously pursue both security and autonomy. Autonomy, or in other words 
freedom of action, is desirable as it allows states to effectively pursue their foreign policy 
interests. To reach an optimum outcome, states balance their security and autonomy 
                                               
8. James Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of 
Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science, 35, No. 4 (Nov., 1991): 904-933. 
9. Jack S. Levy, “Alliance Formation and War Behavior,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25, No. 4 





needs. For instance, states with relatively more security than autonomy will seek more 
autonomy while states with relatively more autonomy than security will enhance their 
security by sacrificing autonomy. Asymmetric interests can lead to the development of 
asymmetric alliances in which a major power pursuing more autonomy exchanges 
security with a minor power seeking security.10 Provision of autonomy is generally 
thought to take the form of political or economic concessions such as increased trade 
access.11  
 
Alliance Durability  
 
Another focus area for the literature has been the causes of alliance termination. For 
Realists, such as Walt, the downfall of alliances is linked directly to the core justifications 
of the alliance. When these underlying factors shift and change overtime, the 
underpinnings of an alliance can weaken. A decrease in the threat facing alliance 
partners or a reduction in perceived reliability of a partner diminishes the expected 
return of an alliance and can drive alliance collapse.12  
 
For the 25% of alliances that fail during times of need rather than dissolving beforehand, 
institutional 'stickiness' is often a factor. Once institutions are set in place, the inertia of 
                                               
10. James Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of 
Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science, 35, No. 4 (Nov., 1991): 904-933. 
11. Benjamin Fordham, “Trade and Asymmetric Alliances,” Journal of Peace Research, 47, No. 6  (2010): 
685-696. 





the system creates a 'stickiness' by which the institution resists change or dissolution.13 
For alliances, maintaining the relationship often involves lower costs that dissolving it. 
Yet this property can mask substantial changes in the underlying justification of an 
alliance. When circumstances finally require the fulfillment of costly alliance obligations, 
institutional stickiness alone is not sufficient to overcome the rot in the relationship.14  
Empirical findings that relationships with high degrees of institutionalization do not 
feature increased likelihood of follow through tend to support this argument.15  
 
Besides institutional stickiness, empirical research has identified other factors which 
influence the longevity of an alliance. Gaubatz finds that democratic states tend to have 
particularly strong alliances with one another.16 Meanwhile, several researchers have 
found that asymmetric alliances tend to be strong as issue linkage allows for a better 
exchange of benefits.171819 
 
Asymmetric Alliances 
                                               
13. Paul Pierson, “Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change,” Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy and Administration, 13, No. 4 (Oct., 2000) 475-499. 
14. Brett A. Leeds, Andrew G. Long, and Sara M. Mitchell, “Reevaluating Alliance Reliability,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44, No. 5 (Oct., 2000): 686-699. 
15. Brett A. Leeds and Sezi Anac, “Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance,” International 
Interactions, 31 (2005): 182-202. 
16. Kurt Gaubatz, “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations,” International 
Organization, 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996): 109-139. 
17. Simon Collard-Wexler, “Strength in Number? Testing the Effects of Alliance Size on Alliance 
Duration,” Working paper, Columbia University, New York, 2009. 
18. Brett A. Leeds and Burcu Savun, “Alliance Termination: Explaining Decisions to Abrogate or 
Renegotiate Existing Alliances,” Paper presented at the conference of the Annual Meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2004. 
19. Scott D. Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration,” American Journal of Political 






One area the literature explores is the relationship between states of vastly different 
power potential. The theoretical side of the literature, especially from the Realist School, 
concentrates on Great Power relations. For Realists, the Great Powers are the key units 
of action in the international scene and deserve the most attention. From the Congress of 
Vienna to the end of WWII, for instance, the international political realm was dominated 
by shifting alliances amongst Great Powers who sought to maintain a balance of power. 
The drive by states for relative gains and enhanced security lends itself to a multipolar 
norm. Yet, the bipolarity and unipolarity of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, 
respectively, featured security capabilities concentrated in hands of only one or two 
states. As such, most countries were relatively smaller than the dominate powers, 
heightening the importance of asymmetric alliances.  
 
These asymmetric relationships not only feature a divergence in the assets available to 
the two partners but also a divergence in the benefits gained by each state. For Realists, 
states form alliances to enhance their security. Yet, small states offer relatively little 
additional security to a larger state. At the same time, such a relationship increases the 
security commitments of the larger partner. Under the Capabilities Aggregation Model, 
this situation should have little appeal for the larger state.  
 
However, relationships between large states and small states do exist. To address this 





supposes that states are not only concerned with security but also autonomy on the 
international scene.20 This two factor model, in some ways, is similar to Riccardo’s 
principal of comparative advantage in economics. For Riccardo, states are better off 
producing goods which they are relatively more efficient at producing and trading these 
in exchange for goods that they are relativity less efficient at producing. By trading, both 
states are better off than if they attempted to produce these goods independently.  
 
Similarly, in the two factor Autonomy-Security Model, larger states are relatively rich in 
security compared to their autonomy. Small states are security poor and relatively 
autonomy rich. By trading security and autonomy via an alliance, each state is better off. 
As small states provide only meagre security benefits, the provision of autonomy to the 
large state provides the main incentive for alliance formation, highlighting the limits of 
the Capabilities Aggregation Model.2122  
 
Large states can provide security through several actions such as military guarantees or 
weapon sales. Small states, in turn, can deliver autonomy benefits by, for instance, 
aligning their foreign policy with the goals of a larger state. A small state can also 
provide enhanced trade benefits to reward a large state. Cooperation in trade can help 
states build mutual trust, enabling a deeper level of interaction on the security front. 
                                               
20. James Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of 
Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science, 35, No. 4 (Nov., 1991): 904. 
21. James Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of 
Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science, 35, No. 4 (Nov., 1991): 904. 
22. Gerald Sorokin, “Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries,” International 





Long and Leeds find that allies often increase their level of trade.23 This behavior is 
particularly seen within asymmetric relationships. For larger states with an important 
economic relationship, the provision of security guarantees to a junior partner may be 
the most efficient way to ensure that the economic relationship is uninterrupted.24 
 
The existence of asymmetric benefit exchanges and viability of the Autonomy-Security 
Model is further reinforced through the alliance literature’s discussion of free ridership. 
With little security to contribute, small states tend to decrease their security 
expenditures, in some cases to zero, once they are protected by a larger ally.25 This 
behavior tends to decrease joint security and calls into question the viability of the 
aggregate capabilities model. For the small partner, the security provided by the larger 
partner can more than offset the decrease in domestically provided security, providing a 
strong incentive to continue the relationship but a strong disincentive for the large state. 
The Autonomy-Security Model helps explain why large states remain in an alliance with 
falling aggregate capabilities by arguing that large states are incentivized through non-
security benefits. For instance, despite the failure of many NATO countries to meet the 
long standing 2% of GDP military expenditure target, the US continues to participate in 
the alliance.26  
                                               
23. Andrew Long and Brett Leeds, “Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic  
Agreements,” Journal of Peace Research, 43, No. 3 (2006): 445. 
24. Benjamin Fordham, “Trade and Asymmetric Alliances,” Journal of Peace Research, 47, No. 6 (2010): 
694. 
25. Jonathan Borck, David King, and Richard Zeckhauser, “Contribution Shares in Alliances,”  
Proceedings of the IASTED International Conference, Albert, Canada, (July 2003): 32.  
26. Naftali Bendavid. "Just Five of 28 NATO Members Meet Defense Spending Goal, Report Says," The 






The attractiveness of autonomy benefits is demonstrated by the various military 
coalitions the US has formed even when the US is the overwhelming capabilities 
provider. By conducting otherwise unilateral operations through multilateral coalitions, 
the US receives autonomy benefits through the enhanced legitimacy of its actions. From 
an international legal perspective, unilateral military actions are illegal and illegitimate 
without a UN authorization. However, as Russia and China have the opportunity to 
veto a resolution, UN backing may not be available to support proposed US actions. 
However, as the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty laid 
out in its report “Responsibility to Protect,” if the UN fails to act to resolve a crisis, states 
can take action under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter by working through regional 
organizations. During the intervention in Kosovo, for instance, the US was able to 




For parties receiving security benefits, the refusal of an ally to honor their commitments 
during a dire hour of need can threaten the very existence of a state. Given the stakes, 
states seek partners that will follow through on their commitments when needed. 
Therefore, the perception of state reliability is a key variable when selecting an ally 
                                               
27. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility To Protect, 





because the expected value of the relationship is a function of the perceived reliability of 
a partner.  
 
Empirical research supports this view as states tend to form alliances with partners 
expected to follow through on their commitments, with some 75% functioning as 
planned.28  Given reputation’s role in alliance selection, reputable states often find more 
willing and more reliable partners.2930 Democracies, in particular, have been found 
reliable despite frequent turn over in administration as the process of ratifying an 
alliance often requires buy in from across the political spectrum. Dictatorial regimes, 
meanwhile, only represent the interests of a small constituency. When replaced by a new 
regime, policies are likely to undergo a shift.31  
 
The literature has also addressed ways in which states can enhance their reputation. 
Fearson, for instance, argues that states can enhance their reputation for reliability by 
incurring costs when sending political messages in order to demonstrate the seriousness 
of their actions. Furthermore, these costs lock leaders into their decisions and thus make 
follow through more likely.32  
                                               
28. Brett A. Leeds, Andrew G. Long, and Sara M. Mitchell, “Reevaluating Alliance Reliability,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44, No. 5 (Oct., 2000): 686-699. 
29. Douglas Gibler, “The Cost of Reneging, Reputation and Alliance Formation,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 52, No. 3 (June 2008): 426-454. 
30. Gregory D. Miller, “Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past,” 
Security Studies, 12, No. 3: 40-78. 
31. Brett A. Leeds, Michaela Mattes, and Jeremy S. Vogel, “Interest, Institutions, and the Reliability of 
International Commitments,” American Journal of Political Science, 53, No. 2 (Apr. 2009): 461-476. 







The substantial benefits derived from an alliance would seem to provide a powerful 
incentive for small states to seek out larger partners.  However, while many small state-
large state combinations theoretically exist, only relatively few partnerships form.  
 
The literature finds that the selection process is dominated by the perceived reliability of 
a potential partner. If a partner is not expected to be reliable, the alliance will have little 
value. Yet, how is reliability measured? The literature argues that reliability is based on 
long-term past behavior of a state in its dealings with others.333435 As such, a reputation 
for reliability increases the willingness of partners to invest in a relationship as a strong 
return on investment can be expected.36  
 
Figure 1. Expected Returns 
 
The above figure, adapted from Anthony Downs’ rational choice theory, highlights 
the central role that perceived reliability in alliance selection choices plays.37  
 
 
For a rational actor, the decision to form an alliance is based on expected returns. If these 
returns are positive, an alliance would be a rational choice. Of the three variables - 
                                               
33. Andrew Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,” California Law Review, 90, 
No. 6 (Dec., 2002): 1849. 
34. Mark Crescenzi, Jacob Kathman, Katja Kleinberg, and Reed Wood, “Reliability, Reputation,  
and Alliance Formation,” International Studies Quarterly, 56, (2012): 262. 
35. Douglas Gibler, “The Cost of Reneging, Reputation and Alliance Formation,” Journal of  
Conflict Resolution, 52, No. 3 (June 2008): 450. 
36. John Cony, “The Portfolio Benefits of Free Riding in Military Alliances,” International Studies  
Quarterly, 38, No. 3 (Sep., 1994): 408. 
37. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper, 1957. 





partner provided benefits, alliance costs, and perceived reliability - the first two can be 
assessed with a high degree of confidence. Perceived reliability, however, is difficult to 
estimate despite its importance to the equation. A partner with tremendous capabilities 
and who is perceived to be reliable, for instance, would be an attractive ally. However, if 
the partner, in reality, only follows through on its commitments 50% of the time, the 
value of the partnership is greatly diminished. This is illustrated in the below figure. 
 
Figure 2. Investment Payoff 
In the above figure, as the perceived reliability of a US partner increases the expected 
value of that partner’s contribution (i.e. assets) increases. If these first two variables 
are known, then the level of marginal US expenses required to support the 
partnership will determine whether the alliance is expected to have a positive or 

















increases the likelihood that the partnership will be viewed by the US as having a 




While reputation is an important factor in determining the potential value of an alliance, 
it also can encourage compliance by the parties. This influence, however, is variable due 
to network effects - the influence of third party relationships on a bilateral relationship - 
as the size of an entity’s partnership network is variable. The business literature has 
found that network effects are important in ensuring “community enforcement” of 
bilateral strategic alliances.38 Robinson and Stuart, furthermore, find that, “Within the 
framework of an alliance network, a firm must weigh the benefits of taking actions that 
are beneficial to itself at the expense of its counterparty not only against the lost 
opportunities with that firm but also against the lost opportunities with other firms that 
can be reached within the network.”39  
 
In the International Relations context, when states with large networks fail to comply 
with the benefit exchange in one bilateral relationship, they may degrade their standing 
with their other partners. States with only a single partnership do not face this issue. 
With dozens of allies, network effects could impose large negative externalities on the 
US if it fell short in its bilateral commitments. With fewer partnerships, America’s 
                                               
38. The lack of an absolute authority in international relations makes a business environment where 
transactions are enforced through community approbation rather than the courts a comparable situation. 
39. David Robinson and Toby Stuart, "Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic Alliances," Journal 






asymmetric partners have relatively more freedom to reduce their benefit provision once 
an alliance is declared. 
 
Areas for Future Research 
 
The literature provides valuable insights into the nature of alliances such as the 
widespread existence of alliance between countries with varying degrees of power and 
that these alliances may be rooted in an asymmetric exchange of benefits. The literature 
also calls to attention the importance of reputation in alliance selection and its variable 
influence on enforcement. However, the literature fails to explore whether network 
effects and the potentially short-term nature of reliability perceptions allow small states 
to cast themselves as reputable only to gain an alliance only to pull back these benefits 
once one is secure.  
 
Currently, the evaluation of asymmetric alliances rests upon the foundation that small-
state reputation is a long-term aspect of small-state identity. The literature argues that a 
reputation for reliability drives the selection process wherein reliable small states that 
deliver political or economic benefits are chosen over unreliable small states. 
 
However, transitions between administrations are opportunities for a new first 
impression. First, as some alliances are designated as such by the President, a transition 





for this designation. Second, at the institutional level, transitions between 
administrations can degrade collective knowledge. As Kumar details through her 
extensive interviews with past National Security Council staff, transitions between 
administrations led to large changes in key NSC personnel. The transition from the Ford 
to Carter administration saw only three NSC staff members retained. The Bush to 
Obama transition, by contrast, was a first in that a sizeable number of staff remained on. 
Even in that instance, however, directors and deputy directors of the NSC’s directorates 
were replaced. 40  NSC staff members who were nonpartisan also struggled to connect 
with political appointees and the new president in the politicized environment of the 
White House.41 This suggests that even if transitioning NCS staff members can provide 
some institutional knowledge, their ability to encourage policy continuity will be 
challenged as new staff members bring in new ideas and a sense of tribalism formed 
during the presidential campaign. 
 
Besides outgoing staff, transitions can degrade institutional knowledge through the 
removal of key records from NSC work spaces. These records and working papers are 
typically moved to the National Archives or a presidential library. Without these 
records, incoming staff lack readily accessible documentation of previous agreements, 
findings, or justification for past policy. Again the Bush-Obama transition tried to 
prevent this degradation by leaving a set of presidential memos on all major foreign 
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policy issues to provide a justification for the Bush administration’s policy decisions and 
highlight the challenges which remained. These efforts, however, appeared to have no 
impact on Obama administration policy choices as the memos were viewed as a legacy-
oriented effort by the Bush administration.42  
 
Given the impactful nature of these transitions, small states have a window to create a 
new first impression. Small states face a strong incentive to gain access to the resources 
of a larger partner because they are seeking security benefits to ensure their survival. To 
do so, if the Autonomy-Security Model is applicable, they must convince a US 
administration that they can deliver political and economic benefits reliably. As 
transitions between administrations create turn over in personnel and degradation in 
institutional knowledge, small states may be able to drive perceptions of reliability 




Alliance formation has played a pivotal role in the history of human relations. Facing a 
common threat, states can enhance their mutual security by collaborating. Alliances also 
can be asymmetric wherein only one state is a provider of security rather than both 
parties. In these situations, the literature points to a large state’s desire to secure 
enhanced trade or gain political acquiesce.  Despite these incentives for a partnership, a 
                                               





key variable in alliance formation is the perception of state reliability. An alliance is an 
investment wherein states commit resources based on an expected return. A state 
viewed as unreliable would provide zero return on investment. As such, only states that 
are viewed as reliable are likely chosen for partnerships.  
 
Yet what drives perceptions of reliability? The literature argues that reliability is a core 
aspect of a state’s identity, one that is built over an extended period of time. Thus, if 
perceptions are a long term factor, states can do little to alter this perception in the short 
run. The US, however, appears to operate on a short-run basis as transitions between 
administrations bring new policymakers to the fore.  
 
To determine whether states exploit reliability calculations formulated through short-
term impressions, my research examines changes in state behavior during the years 
prior to the formation of an alliance from a baseline time period. I hypothesize that small 
states seeking an asymmetric partnership can shift perceptions of reliability through 
short term changes in behavior. To do so, they will likely increase the delivery of 
expected returns –enhanced trade or political acquiescence – to their larger partner.  
 
Following the formation of an alliance, I hypothesis that both partners will seek to 
maximize their returns from the alliance by minimizing the costs associated with the 
partnership while retaining the benefits provided by their partner. A small state seeking 





seeking to minimize costs could withdrawal security benefits. The literature’s 
exploration of network effects, however, suggests that large states could suffer costs in 
their other relationships as their reputation degrades. These external costs may be 
greater than the cost savings gained by cutting back security provision in a single 
bilateral relationship. With small states generally maintaining fewer partnerships than 
their larger partner, smaller states suffer less from network effects and therefore face 
fewer external costs when withdrawing the delivery of political and economic benefits 
as they seek to maximize their returns from the alliance. 
 
The intellectual basis for the above hypothesis rests of several assumptions on the nature 
of state behavior. The first assumption is that alliances between states with asymmetric 
power levels feature exchanges of asymmetric benefits. This is shared by Morrow’s 
Autonomy-Security Exchange Model. An additional assumption I share with Morrow’s 
model is that states are rational actors seeking to maximize state power by reaching an 
autonomy and security equilibrium.  
 
My third assumption differs from the alliance literature’s expectations on the 
development of state reliability perceptions. I share the view that partner reputation is 
key variable in a state’s evaluation of an alliance’s expected benefits. Indeed, if a partner 
has significant capabilities but is not expected to follow through on their obligations 





others. Unlike the literature, my hypothesis assumes that a reputation for reliability can 
be constructed in the short term through a consistent demonstration of aligned policy.  
 
The final assumption is that small states and large states face different costs in not 
delivering the expected benefits of the alliance, incorporating the literature’s insights 
into network effects.  The US has a large number of alliances while each MNNA has 
relatively few. With the declaration of a new alliance, the US engages its prestige and 
reputation for reliability in the endeavor. Failing to provide security benefits to one 
partner can damage America’s reputation for reliability in the eyes of its other partners. 
These secondary effects probably inform US decisions and acts to damper any 
willingness to reduce security benefits to an individual partner. By contrast, small states 
suffer from network effects to a lesser degree and so they face relatively lower network 
costs for curtailing benefit delivery. With lowered networked costs, smaller states have 
relatively more freedom of action in reducing the costs it incurs as part of the 
partnership by curtail the delivery of benefits. 
 
These assumptions and the resulting hypotheses inform the data selected and the 
method of analysis.  As I assume that states act for the overall benefit of the state, the 
data selected are broad metrics which capture behavior at a macro level. As such, these 
metrics may not be appropriate for different levels of analysis. For instance, if the issue 
was examined at the leadership level, economic or political benefits could be provide 





limitation of my assumptions is that I only examine the delivery of political and 
economic benefits by the small states. As such, the proxies are inappropriate to capture 
benefits delivered in the security realm by small states. In addition, the proxies do not 
account for other, factors such as prestige or ideological concerns.   
 




To explore the behavior of small partners before and after an alliance was formed, I 
sought cases which could control for several variables. First, I wanted to control for the 
larger partner. The US is an ideal large partner to study as there are many alliances to 
examine. Next, I wanted to control for the benefits provided by the US as these could 
influence the behavior of a US ally. NATO allies were an option as the US provides 
security benefits as specified by the NATO Treaty equally to all members. The 
multilateral nature of NATO, however, complicates the picture as the US is not the only 
provider of security benefits. In NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission, for instance, a 
variety of NATO allies provide security benefits to Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. As 
these countries are allies with the US via their participation in NATO, the direct 






With this concern excluding NATO allies, I focused on the cases of Major Non-NATO 
Allies. The MNNA designation was initiated in 1989 with the selection of Australia, 
Egypt, Israel, Japan, and South Korea.43 Since then, additional countries have been 
designated by the US President and between 1989 and 2013, 15 states have been 
selected.4445 The designation provides access to a variety of benefits including access to 
training, joint research & development, and eligibility for arms export. While the 
designation does not guarantee that the US will provide all available benefits, the 
designation opens the door to the same suite of opportunities for the US partners.  
 
As I will be testing the behavior of the cases under a modified Security-Autonomy 
Exchange Model, it is important that the selected cases be asymmetric. Borrowing 
Morrow’s definition, I define an asymmetric relationship as one that occurs between 
states of different power categories. These categories are superpower, major power, and 
minor power. Alliances between a major power and minor power would be asymmetric 
with the larger state being the major power and the smaller state being the minor power. 
Alliances between similar types, for instance, a minor power and a minor power would 
be symmetric.  
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With MNNA varying in capabilities and size, to ensure that the relationship between the 
US and each MNNA is indeed asymmetric I compared the relative strengths of the 
partners by using the Composite Index of National Capability, Version 4.0, a measure of 
state power incorporating several factors including population size, economic measures, 
and military power.  The CINC's focus on hard power capability is suitable for an 
examination of security relationships even though it ignores soft power factors that may 
be important in some international issues.46  
 
While the CINC provides useful data on relative power, it alone does not provide clarity 
on when the power differences are great enough for a relationship to be asymmetric 
rather than symmetric in nature. The CINC database tracks state power between the 
early 1800s to the present day and allows for an examination of historic cases to lend 
insight to this question.  
 
To determine when the gap between states in CINC score reflects an asymmetric or 
symmetric relationship, I examined instances of peer competitors when on the brink of 
conflict. These relationships can provide the basis for understanding when a relationship 
is symmetrical and by contrast, asymmetric. 
 
In the first case, I examined the power disparity between the United Kingdom and 
Germany in 1914. The two had engaged in a Great Power competition for influence in 
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Europe and Africa while participating in a naval arms race for over two decades. By 
1914, Germany was rated at 0.1582045 in the CINC while the UK was rated at 0.1379118. 
As the weaker power, the UK’s strength was approximately 87% of Germany’s strength.  
 
The second case I examined was the power disparity between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in 1963, the year of the Cuban Missile Crisis. At that time, the US and 
Soviet Union were engaged in a long term, worldwide, ideological competition. In 1963, 
the US was rated at 0.2079665 while the Soviet Union was rated at 0.17128. The Soviet 
Union was approximately 82% as strong as the US at this point in the Cold War. 
 
The assessment that the dyads were symmetric is reflected in the nature of the conflicts 
which followed. In the UK-Germany case, the two engaged in a multiyear war of 
attrition which consumed millions of lives and engaged the entirety of each nation. A 
war between asymmetric powers would have probably been resolved quickly and 
decisively. In the US-Soviet case, while the Cuban Missile Crisis did not result in an 
armed conflict, the durability of the Cold War over the next several decades suggests 
that the Cold War competition was another example of a symmetric dyad. Both of these 
cases of a durable, symmetric relationship feature less than a 20% power gap between 
the two states. As such, for the purposes of this study, I classify a relationship with less 






To determine if the MNNA cases met the criteria, I examined the CINC database and 
compared the power difference for each dyad during the year the MNNA designation 
was declared. In 1989, for instance, Japan had 38% of the power the US did while South 
Korea and Australia possessed 13% and 5% respectively. Overall, each MNNA case was 




To test for the provision of political or economic benefits by MNNAs, I utilize four 
different measures. For the first proxy, I use UN voting data as a proxy for political 
acquiescence. The data originates from a project undertaken by Harvard and 
Georgetown to catalog each roll call vote within the UN General Assembly. From this 
data, I determine the voting congruence between the US and each member of the general 
assembly. 47 To create a baseline measure, I average the behavior of each MNNA in the 
ten to six years prior to the declaration year. I then compare this measure to the average 
behavior in the five years immediately preceding the declaration year. To examine the 
behavior of states after alliance formation, I compare the five years prior to the alliance 
formation to five years after. This is illustrated below. 
 
                                               





Figure 3. Years Examined Preceding Alliance Formation 
 
The figure above demonstrates the years used to construct baseline and short-term 
averages for each MNNA. 
 





The figure above demonstrates the years used to construct the two five year averages 
for each MNNA. 
 
The second proxy uses sanctions compliance to see if MNNAs deliver political benefits 
in a more costly manner. I compare the level of trade between future MNNA partners 
and countries under unilateral-US sanctions as these sanctions target numerous 
countries over a long period of time. As they are unilateral, compliance with the 
sanctions by third parties is voluntary. The widely respected and analyzed Correlates of 
War Project compiles international trade data and is the basis for this proxy.48  
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The third proxy examines the trade relationship between the US and MNNA by using 
the Correlates of War Project’s trade data. A MNNA could use their trade relationship to 
reward the US with economic benefits by, for instance, expanding US market access.  
 
The final proxy examines changes in the market share of US arms exports to MNNAs to 
examine an alternative method of delivering economic benefits. Unlike the third proxy, 
the narrow nature of the arms market allows an MNNA a much greater degree of 
control over the benefits potentially directed at the United States. By using the third and 




As the literature highlights, one of the prime benefits that small states can deliver to 
their larger partners is political acquiesce. A prime forum in which to deliver political 
benefits is in the United Nations General Assembly. The General Assembly is a low risk 
method for a state to demonstrate policy alignment with the United States as the votes 
are typically little consequence. To examine whether small states leverage the UN 
General Assembly within the context of enhance their reputation for reliability, I used 
the data set entitled United Nations General Assembly Voting Data. The data set 





produced by Erik Voeten and Anton Strezhnev of Georgetown and Harvard University 
respectively.49  
 
For the purposes of this research, I developed a political benefits proxy by first 
extracting the “affinity scores” for the years 1979-2011. Affinity scores show the level of 
policy agreement between two states through calculating the percentage of votes which 
resulted in the same position. In other words, a dyad of two states with a high affinity 
score will have very similar voting records while a dyad with a low affinity score will 
have very dissimilar voting records. The time frame of 1979 to 2011 was chosen in order 
to encompass the behavior of all states before each MNNA declaration took place.  
 
For each US-MNNA dyad, I first identified the year in which the declaration took place. 
From this point, the voting affinity scores for the five years prior to the declaration year 
were extracted from the larger data set. By way of example, in the case of Japan an 
MNNA declaration took place in 1989 and so the voting affinity scores for the years 1984 
through 1988 were compiled and averaged to produce a short term behavior affinity 
level.  
 
This was compared with the average behavior in year 1979-1984 to see if there was a 
significant shift in the years leading up to the alliance declaration. Finally to determine if 
                                               







Japan’s behavior changed after the alliance, I averaged Japan’s scores between 1990-1994 
and compared this to the average found for the years 1984-1988. 
 
A second measure derived from the UN voting data is a weighted measure. While the 
previous measure examines isolated state behavior, one weakness is that the MNNA 
declarations took place in different years. For the Japanese declaration in 1989, the 
baseline is composed of votes from 1979 through 1983. This baseline is compared to the 
average affinity of the US and Japan from 1984 through 1988. These years lie in the heart 
of heightened Cold War tensions. By contrast, data from 1988 to 1997 is used to examine 
the Argentinean declaration in 1998. 
 
The differences in time periods examined introduce the possibility that an external factor 
may be driving dissimilar trends amongst dyads. In an effort to control this possibility, 
each year of affinity information is weighted and then averaged. The weighted figure is 
constructed separately for each year by averaging the affinity scores for all dyads that 
include the United States. These figures are in essence the average agreement of the 
world to US positions in the UN General Assembly. By incorporating this weight, any 
change is dyad affinity will be due to factors outside of general global trends. For 
instance, affinity scores from 1979-1983 were used to construct the Israel medium term 
baseline and scores from 1984-1988 were used to construct the Israel short term behavior 
score. In 1979, I subtracted the world average from the Israeli behavior to create a 





were averaged to create the baseline figure. The same was done for the weighted scores 
for 1984-1988 to create the weighted short-term behavior affinity level. The percentage 
change between the baseline figure and the short-term behavior affinity level was 




The second metric, focusing on sanctions compliance, was also used to detect the 
delivery of political benefits. While the UN voting discussed above is useful to explore 
general political alignment, the sanctions metric used brings its own value. The UN 
metric is an easy way for a state to demonstrate policy agreement to the United States. 
This ease, however, undermines the value of any alignment. From the US perspective, 
selecting a state for an MNNA declaration involves certain monetary and prestige costs. 
Yet alignment in UN voting provides limited value. Moreover, the UN General 
Assembly votes that covers a broad spectrum of issues which may not hold equal weight 
for the United States.  
 
The sanctions compliance metric, however, helps to fill these gaps in our observation of 
state behavior. First, to alter a state’s score in the metric requires specific costs to the 
state. Second, sanctions compliance provides the US with tangible benefits. Finally, the 
sanctions compliance metric focuses on specific cases, all of which are substantially 





spectrum of potential political benefits ranging from the broad to the narrow and from 
the tangible to the abstract.  
 
The sanctions metric was constructed through comparing the trade relationship between 
MNNAs and states under unilateral-US sanctions in the medium term using the same 
time periods identified for the first proxy.  
 
To identify states that were under unilateral US-sanctions, I used data generated by the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics. The data compiles all episodes of 
economic sanctions imposed from 1916 to 2006. The data lists the year the sanctions 
were imposed, when they were lifted, the primary sender of sanctions, primary target 
and the primary cause. The cases extracted were those where the primary sender was 
the United States and that were ongoing from 1983 to 2006. Cases which targeted an 
international organization were excluded as they are non-state specific. As the data is 
measured at the state-to-state level,  
 
The cases were further refined by selecting the cases in which sanctions were in effect for 
a dyad’s entire short-term window. By way of example, with Egypt’s short term 





that were active on or before 1983 and concluded on or after 1988 were included. In 
total, 162 dyads of MNNAs and sanctioned states were examined.50  
 
With the cases selected, I utilized the dyad trade data developed by the Correlates of 
War data to examine the trade relationship between MNNAs and states under US 
sanctions. The Correlates of War data includes a comprehensive list of dyads for all 
states within the international system and provides import data for each country in the 
dyad. The data figures are measured in 1990 US Dollars. In the case of Japan, states 
under US unilateral sanctions in the period of 1983-1988 include North Korea, Cuba, 
Chile, the USSR, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Libya, Pakistan, Iraq, Nicaragua, 
Zimbabwe, and Romania. In each instance, I extracted from the data Japan’s imports 
from and exports to each country. From these figures I calculated a total trade figure by 
summing both.51  
 
Information was extracted from the dyad trade data set for each year in both the 
baseline time period and short term window. These figures are in the years ten to five 
years prior to the declaration year and time five years prior to the declaration 
respectively. The figures in both the medium-term and short-term windows were 
averaged to produce a baseline level of trade and a short-term trade level. With these 
two scores, the percentage change between the baseline and short-term trade level was 
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calculated. These figures were then categorized as either having an increasing or 
decreasing economic relationship. Finally, the percentage of cases that had positive 
growth was calculated for each MNNA partner. Those MNNAs that decreased trade in 




For the third proxy, I examine the trade relationships between MNNAs and the United 
States. With the UN voting and sanctions compliance metrics, our research sought to 
detect demonstrations of political acquiesce theorized by the literature. The literature, 
however, also discusses the potential for economic relations to play an important role in 
a small state’s contribution to an asymmetric alliance. This third metric will help to 
address this possibility. 
 
The data set I used was provided by the Correlates of War Project. The data set is 
composed of a series of dyads that tracks the imports each country in the dyad receives 
from the other. For each MNNA partner, I extracted the import and export data in order 
to calculate several figures that would represent the state of the dyad relationship. I then 
identified the change in average behavior between the three time periods used in the 






Analysis was conducted on both the total trade relationship and the net exports of the 
US. Growth in total trade would reflect an increasingly interconnected relationship. The 
second figure, US Net Exports, by contrast, focuses on the benefits accrued to the US 
from the relationship if we assume that exports are viewed more favorably than imports 




While the previous metric addressed the overall trade relationship of specific dyads, the 
final metric is much more narrowly focused on military trade. The area of military sales 
is one that is typically solely under government control. Though overall trade could be 
shifted in favor of the US through the adoption of specific import regulations, for 
instance, governments can do only so much to increase US exports by the economy as a 
whole. By contrast, governments are typically the sole purchasers of military arms and 
services within a country and so, the government can channel a country’s arms imports 
towards specific partners. The complexity and service life of military products can 
promote a long term relationship between the producer and purchaser as new weapon 
systems, such as new fighter jets, require training for the pilots and aircrew, purchases 
of specific ammunition suited for the weapons platform, and future purchases of 






The data used to examine this issue was produced by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute. Entitled the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, the information provided 
by SIPRI comprehensively covers all major sales of conventional arms between countries 
from 1950 to present.52 
 
From this database, I extracted information on the value and supplier of imported arms 
for each MNNA in both the medium term and short term prior to the declaration year. 
Data from ten to six years prior the declaration year was used to construct a baseline to 
which data five years prior was compared to. Finally, to see if benefits start flowing after 
the alliance, I compared data for the five years after an alliance declaration to the five 
years prior. 
 
For each year being examined, I extracted the value of American sales to the MNNA and 
then calculated the total value of an MNNA’s imports for the year. I then summed the 
total import figures and the US sales figures to produce a value representing the 
complete value of military sales during all three time periods. The percentage of US 
sales from the total value of imports was then calculated. The result was two figures: the 
US market share during the baseline period, in the five years prior to the alliance, and in 
the five years after the alliance declaration.  
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Chapter Two: Testing Results and Results Interpretation 
Benefit Delivery Preceding Alliance Formation 
UN Voting Data 
 
After following each step as outlined in the methodology section, I produced two main 
results for each MNNA, one weighted by average global behavior, and one raw figure. 
Each figure showed the change in behavior of each MNNA from the medium term 
baseline to the short term as a percentage. In the unweighted instance, I examined 14 
MNNA partners as South Korea was only admitted to the United Nations in 1991 and 
therefore lacks a voting record to examine. Of the 14 cases, only four demonstrate an 
increased affinity to American voting positions from the baseline figure to the US figure. 
These cases are Jordan, New Zealand, Argentina, and Afghanistan. Argentina, in 
particular, featured the largest shift in affinity moving from an average affinity of 
approximately 22% during the baseline to nearly 55% affinity during the short term. Of 
note, the number of countries that agreed with the United States on at least 50% of 
General Assembly votes increased from only 3/14 in the baseline to 4/14 in the short 
term. Despite this improvement, a majority of MNNAs disagreed with the US position a 
majority of the time. Overall, MNNA’s on average saw approximately a 2% increase in 
voting affinity with the US from the baseline to the short term window prior to the 






The weighted figures showed a greater affinity for US positions. These figures were also 
calculated for 14 MNNA partners. Of the cases, six showed positive increases in affinity 
for US positions. These included Israel, Argentina, Bahrain, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Pakistan. Again, Argentina was the stand out of the group as it was the only MNNA 
partner that transition from a below average affinity score to an above average score. Of 
note, only four MNNA voted with the US more than the global average in the baseline 
and only five MNNA voted with the US more than the global average in the short term. 
See Appendix B for full results. 
 
Overall, MNNA’s on average saw a 91% increase in voting affinity with the US from the 
baseline to the short term window prior to the declaration year. This was mostly driven 
by the 15 times increase in Argentina’s affinity relative to the global average. Excluding 
Argentina, the MNNA’s exhibited a 24% decline in affinity to the US position relative to 




When examining the prospect of MNNAs decreasing their economic interactions with 
states under US unilateral sanctions, I utilized three interacted measures in order to 
explore the range of possible state action: imports from states under sanction, export to 
states under sanction, and total trade levels. For each we created a baseline level to 





In my examination of exports by MNNAs to countries under US sanction, there was a 
mixed record with each MNNA decreasing exports to select sanctioned states while 
increasing their relationships with others. Of the 14 MNNAs examined, only three 
decreased their exports to a majority of the sanctioned states. Even Israel, which did not 
increase exports to eight of 11 states under sanction, still had sharp increases with 
Guatemala with a 208% increase in exports. In total, of the 146 trade relationships 
examined, 81, some 55%, experienced increased growth. See Appendix C for full results. 
 
In examining net imports, I discovered that in a vast majority of cases, MNNAs 
increased their imports from countries under US sanction. In total, of the 153 trade 
dyads examined, 103 had increasing levels of trade from the baseline to the short term 
window, or approximately 67%. When broken down to the MNNA-by-MNNA level, 
only three MNNAs out of 14 cases decreased imports in the majority of their 
relationships with states under unilateral US sanctions. This includes Israel, South 
Korea, and the Philippines. With the Philippines case, for instance, there was an 
approximately 97% drop in trade with North Korea and a 72% drop in imports from 
Burma. Yet, the Philippines had a huge increase of imports from Iraq with a 155 times 
surge in imports from the baseline to the period measuring the five years prior to the 
MNNA designation. See Appendix E for full results. 
 
The final measure I used to examine sanctions compliance was total trade between 





growth. Of the 14 MNNA states examined, only two experienced a decline in their total 
trade relationship with a majority of states under US sanction. These were Israel and the 




The third proxy measured the role of economic incentives in alliance formation is the 
level of trade between MNNAs and the United States. For the total trade relationship, I 
found that of the 14 MNNAs examined, 13 saw growth in their trade relationship with 
the United States. Only Egypt and Bahrain saw a decrease with an approximately 13% 
and 8% drop respectively. By contrast, the average increase in trade between the US and 
the MNNA partners was over 80%. The largest trade increase was between the US and 
Argentina with the trade in the short term some 1.3 times greater than during the 
baseline period.  See Appendix I for full results. 
 
The second measure I used to examine the trade relationship between the US and 
MNNAs was the net exports of the United States to MNNA partners. A growing net 
export would represent the realization of real gains for the US and a tangible benefit to 
its trade relationship with MNNAs if exports are perceived as being more beneficial 
than imports. Of the 14 cases examined, only four showed an increase in Net US exports. 





of the 14 cases during both the short-term and baseline periods featured a trade surplus 




The last proxy explored military trade between the US and MNNAs prior to their 
designation. The first measure compared the average yearly sales in the baseline period 
to the period in the five years prior to the MNNA designation. The second measure 
addressed the change in US market share of MNNA arms imports from the baseline 
period to the short term period. Of the 14 cases examined, I found that only five 
demonstrated a positive increase in the value of US sales. The second measure was the 
change in US market share compared to other arms producers. Of the 14 states 
examined, seven featured increasing US market share. Of these, Argentina was a true 
stand out with an eleven times increase in market share with the US holding nearly 49% 
of the market during the short term compared to only approximately 4% during the 
baseline. See Appendix K for full results. 
 
While governments often have the ability to direct weapon purchases to favored 
partners, there can be other factors at play. Favorable conditions supporting financing, 
joint production, or technical competitiveness can make other producers more 
competitive. To account for changes in the competitive of US suppliers compared to 





figures. A rise in market share globally and MNNAs in the same time period would 
suggest that US suppliers were becoming more competitive overall rather than MNNAs 
purposefully directing their purchases for political advantage. Of the 15 MNNAs 
examined, eight cases demonstrated increases in market share compared to the US 
market share globally. These cases include Australia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Argentina, 
Bahrain, Thailand, and Afghanistan. See Appendix L for full results. 
 
Interpreting the Results 
 
For each assessment area used to evaluate the change in behavior from a baseline figure 
to a short-term average there were mixed results. In UN voting affinity, I hypothesized 
that states that sought to improve their image with the United States would align their 
UN voting more closely with the US. However, only half of the states improved their 
UN voting affinity. In the examination of sanctions compliance, I expected to see 
decreased trade relations between MNNAs and countries under unilateral US economic 
sanctions. To do so would also increase a MNNAs perceived reliability in delivering 
political benefits. Yet the short-term average was a decrease from the baseline in only 
45% of the export dyads and 41% of the total-trade dyads. With the general trade 
figures, all states, bar Egypt and Bahrain, increased their trade relationship with the US 
though increases in Net Exports for the US only occurred in four of 15 cases.  Finally, in 
the case of military trade, the majority of MNNAs failed to display an increase in the 






Out of the MNNAs, two cases emerge of states providing substantial benefits prior to 
the provision of security benefits by the US: Israel and Argentina. Each of these saw 
improvements in at least three of the four areas explored. Israel and Argentina both 
showed positive increases in their UN voting affinity while having above average levels 
of agreement. In trade, both increased trade with the US with Argentina increasing 
imports of US goods by nearly seven times. In supporting unilateral US sanctions, Israel 
did not increase its trade with 80% of states under sanction. While Argentina was less 
supportive by not increasing economic links with only 37% of sanctioned states. Even 
those relations that saw increases, only Argentina’s trade with Iran and China topped 
$100 million in value. The rest were relatively small relationships.  
 
Finally, both Israel and Argentina saw large increases in the value of US weapons sales 
and in US market share. These are the only two 14 cases which met my hypothesis. Their 
identification provides an avenue for future research in to what drove these increases in 
cooperative behavior and whether the delivery of political and economic benefits to the 
US was coincidental or purposeful.   
 
A prime explanation of why many of the states behaved counter to my hypothesis is the 
potential role of small state security provision. The literature argues that as small states 
possess such feeble amounts of military power, they must provide economic or political 





enticing. A potential MNNA in this position could still undertake a campaign to bolster 
perceptions of reliability by increasing the deliverance of benefits but only in the 
security realm. Such a campaign would not be detected by the metrics used in the study. 
 
This possibility exists in at least two cases: Bahrain and Kuwait. Both failed to improve 
UN voting cooperation, sanctions compliance, US Net Exports or increase the value of 
US military sales. However, both are located in the geopolitically important Persian Gulf 
region. Bahrain was declared an MNNA in 2002 during a time when US basing in the 
country allowed the US military to operate more easily in Afghanistan. Kuwait was 
declared an MNNA in 2004 following the use of Kuwait as a staging ground for the 2003 
invasion of Iraq by US Forces.53  
 
A second possibility is that for a select group of states, no shift in behavior is necessary 
to secure a US declaration as they already process reputations for reliability. Therefore, 
for these states, altering perceptions of reliability is unnecessary. Such states include 
partners with separate alliance treaties including South Korea, Australia, Japan, 
Thailand, and the Philippines. 
 
Overall, I detected two cases, Israel and Argentina, which increased their delivery of 
economic and political benefits in the years leading up to an alliance declaration. These 
efforts may have increased their reputations for reliability and in turn, make the alliance 
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declaration more likely to occur. At the same time, the results also suggest that small 
states may deliver benefits through other means such as security provision. This result 
calls into question the validity of literature’s argument that small states must provide 
either economic or political benefits to demonstrate reliability. With behavior prior to an 
alliance declaration examined, I now turn to examining a state’s behavior following an 
alliance declaration. 
 
Benefit Delivery Following Alliance Formation 
 
As discussed above, the behavior of MNNAs in the years prior to the declaration is 
varied with some states starting to deliver benefits to the US while others did not appear 
to take discernible action. Below I proceed to expand this study by examining the 
behavior of states following the MNNA declaration in several sections.  
 
UN Voting Data 
 
In examining the UN voting patterns of MNNAs, I produced two main measures for 
each MNNA: a raw voting affinity figure and one weighted by average global behavior. 
Each figure showed the change in behavior of each MNNA from the years prior to the 
declaration to the years following the declaration. For both measures, South Korea was 
excluded as it was only admitted to the United Nations in 1991 and therefore lacks a 






For the raw measure, of the 13 cases, only four demonstrated an increased affinity to 
American voting positions. These cases were Australia, Egypt, Israel and Japan. Large 
drops in affinity scores were seen in several cases with six cases falling more than 40%. 
Argentina’s dropped 46%, moving from 56% affinity before the declaration to only 30% 
average affinity in the five years following the declaration. Of note, the number of 
countries that agreed with the United States on at least 50% of General Assembly votes 
decreased from four to three in the years following the agreement. See Appendix A for 
full results. 
 
For the weighted figure, MNNAs showed a greater affinity for US positions. Of the 13 
cases, five showed positive increases in affinity for US positions compared with the rest 
of the world. These included Egypt, New Zealand, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan.  
Argentina was notable as its affinity level fell 96% compared to the global average. The 
number of countries with affinity scores above the global average remained steady at 
five. See Appendix B for full results. 
 
Trade with Sanctioned States 
 
In examining the trade relationships between MNNAs and states under unilateral US 
sanctions, I produced three measures for each MNNA: exports to states under sanction, 





change in behavior of each MNNA from the years prior to the declaration to the years 
following the declaration as a percentage. With these measures, I examined the 14 states 
designated as an MNNA between 1989 and 2004. 
 
For the exports figure, there was a mixed record with each MNNA decreasing exports to 
select sanctioned states while increasing their relationships with others. Of the 14 
MNNAs examined, only three decreased their exports to a majority of the sanctioned 
states. Even Israel, the top performer with decreasing or nonexistent exports to seven of 
10 states under sanction, still had sharp increases to states such as the Soviet Union. In 
total, 90 of the 136 trade relationships examined, some 66%, experienced increased 
growth. See Appendix D for full results. 
 
For the imports figure, I discovered that, in a majority of cases, MNNAs increased their 
imports from countries under US sanction. In total, of the 136 trade dyads examined, 86 
had increasing levels of trade in the years following alliance declaration. Four MNNAs 
out of 14 cases decreased imports in the majority of their relationships with states under 
unilateral US sanctions. These included Israel, New Zealand, Argentina, and the 
Philippines. With the Argentinean case, for instance, there was an approximately 50% 







For the total trade figure, there was also a mixed record. In the 136 dyads examined, 94 
(69%) saw growth. Of the 14 MNNA states examined, only four experienced a decline in 
their total trade relationship with a majority of states under US sanction. These were 




In examining the trade relationships between MNNAs and the US, I produced two 
measures for each MNNA: the total trade relationship and US exports to the MNNA. 
While the total trade relationship served as a proxy for the degree of economic 
interconnectivity of a dyad, growing US exports were used as a proxy for the direct 
benefits received by the US.  
 
For the total trade figure, I found that of the 14 MNNAs examined, 13 saw growth in 
their trade relationship with the US. Only the Philippines saw a decrease with an 
approximate 6% drop. By contrast, the average dyad saw a nearly 63% growth in trade. 
The largest trade increase was between the US and Kuwait with trade some 1.4 times 
greater following the declaration than before. (See Appendix I for full results) 
 
For the US net exports figure, of the 14 cases examined, seven showed an increase in US 
net exports. The largest percentage fall in US net exports was for Bahrain where the US 





million. The time period after the designation, however, saw the surplus turn into an 




In examining the trade relationships between MNNAs and the US, I produced two 
measures for each MNNA: changes in the total value of US arms sales and the change in 
US market share within a particular country. The first shows the monetary value of the 
trade to the US while the second captures how an MNNA may shift its limited budget 
from one supplier to or away from the US as a result of the declaration.  
 
For the total value figure, nine countries increased the total value of the arms imported 
from the US. Some countries increased their purchases greatly with New Zealand 
doubling their arms purchases, Kuwait purchasing over six times as many, Jordan 
purchasing eight times as many, and Pakistan purchasing 13 times as many. The most 
significant drop was Australia decreasing its purchases of US arms by approximately 
53%. (See Appendix K for full results) 
 
For the market share figure, the US also saw gains in ten of the MNNA. Kuwait and 
Pakistan again were exceptional cases. In Kuwait, the US market share grew from 4% to 
approximately 91%. In the Pakistani market, meanwhile, the US increased its market 





case in that the MNNA provides access to additional arms yet US market share dropped 
from 91% to 75% as South Korea diversified to other suppliers. (See Appendix L for full 
results) 
 
Interpreting the Results 
 
Each proxy saw mixed results. In UN voting affinity, the literature expected that states 
seeking to deliver political benefits would increase their affinity scores. I hypothesized, 
however, that following an alliance declaration, states would return to the baseline level 
of affinity to lower the cost of their alliance with the US. In the raw measure the states 
that increased their cooperation with the US were all selected for MNNA status in 1989. 
The lack of increased cooperation in the weighted measure, however, suggests that these 
shifts were due more to the changing political environment as global opinion, on 
average, came more in line with US views.  
 
For the rest of the cases, the drop in affinity for US positions following the declaration is 
not tempered by the weighted data. In raw terms, nine states decreased their 
cooperation following the designation. In weighted terms, cooperation of eight states fell 
after taking into account the global response to US positions. Clearly states did not 






In the examination of trade with sanctioned states, the literature expected states 
delivering political benefits to the US to decrease their trade relations with countries 
under unilateral US economic sanctions. I hypothesized, however, that states seeking to 
maximize their return from the alliance would fail to do so. The majority of MNNA 
seemed to follow this latter impulse as they increased their trade with relationships with 
sanctioned states across the exports, imports, and total trade measures. In fact, Israel was 
the only MNNA that did not increase trade relationships with a majority of the states 
under US sanctions across all three measures. In addition, only Australia and Japan were 
able to accomplish the same result in two of these categories.  The increasing trade 
relationships with a majority of sanctioned states and MNNA suggests that most 
MNNA failed to deliver political benefits to the US through this tool. 
 
The measures used to estimate delivery of political benefits revealed that very few 
MNNAs delivered political benefits to the US using these tools. In the UN, a majority of 
MNNAs decreased their affinity with US positions. At the same time, a majority of 
MNNAs increased their trade relationships with states under US unilateral sanctions. 
This aligns with this study's hypothesis that MNNAs would seek to maximize the value 
of an asymmetric alliance with the US by reducing their delivery of political benefits 
following the US declaration. 
 
The measures used as proxies for delivery of economic benefits to the US, however, 





in 13 of 14 cases. Meanwhile, US net exports to MNNAs also increased in 7 of the 14 
cases. With the fourth proxy, the US grew its arms exports value in 9 of the 14 cases. US 
market share, meanwhile, increased in 10 of the 14 cases. These increases suggest that 
these tools are one way small states may deliver benefits to their larger partner. At the 
same time, it could be indicative of the mutually beneficial nature of these measures. For 
instance, while increasing purchases of US arms benefits the US, it also is beneficial to 
the MNNA who can now access technology that was export controlled prior to the 
declaration.  
 
To determine which MNNAs, overall, delivered benefits to the US, I constructed a 
matrix of the nine total measures. In the five political measures, states that increased 
their UN voting affinity or increased their trade with less than a majority of sanctioned 
states were determined to have delivered benefits to the US. These cases received a score 
of one while cases that failed meet this criteria received a zero. In the four economic 
measures, states that increased trade with the US received a one while those that did not 
received a zero. States that score positively in a majority of the measures in either the 
political or economic fields were judged to have overall delivered benefits to the US in 
those fields.  
 






The figure above demonstrates the overall improvement in benefit delivery to the US 
by MNNAs following the US declaration.  
 
 
Emergent Case Types 
 
By the nature of the study’s design, there are four case types which emerged. These 
cases cover whether a state increased or did not increase its benefit delivery either before 
or after the alliance declaration. A country’s behavior was classified as increasing when 
a majority of the variables showed increases in benefit delivery.  
 
The first case type occurs when a small partner starts increasing its benefit delivery in 





alliance declaration. One example of where this may occur would be in the development 
of a patron-client relationship where the small state’s dependence on the large state’s 
security provision is critical to the regime’s survival. In this situation, a small state may 
be willing to continually take on greater economic and political costs to ensure its 
survival. While the study had limited data on Afghanistan, the government’s 
dependence on US security assistance suggests it could be a potential case. With 
immediate security challenges, economics and international politics become secondary 
concerns. In such a patron-client relationship where the survival of the client is at stake, 
the government may be willing to incur increasing autonomy costs to discourage 
abandonment by its patron.  
 
The second case type occurs when a small state does not increase the delivery of benefits 
to the larger partner in either time period.  In this scenario, the small partner does not 
take steps to increase its reputation for cooperating with the larger partner in the lead up 
to an alliance declaration and fails to start delivering economic or political benefits even 
after it receives military benefits from the larger partner. This suggests that the small 
state is delivering benefits in ways not captured by the metrics. Delivering security 
benefits despite the asymmetry in power between the partners could be a possibility. 
 
This factor appears to be at play with several of the cases including the Philippines, 
Thailand, Bahrain, and partially Kuwait, Morocco, and Pakistan. The first three deliver 





while expanding purchases of US weapons and deepening their trade with the US, show 
little improvement in political cooperation as measured by the proxies. The selection of 
these partners came in quick succession with Bahrain selected on 14 Mar 2002, the 
Philippines on 6 October 2003, Thailand on 30 December 2003, Kuwait on 15 January 
2004, Morocco on 3 June 2004, and Pakistan on 16 June 2004 according to the Federal 
Register.  
 
These cases share a common thread of being selected following the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. In the climate following the attacks, the US developed new 
partnerships to address the threat of Islamist-inspire militancy. Bahrain at the time was 
host to key US Naval installations and along with Kuwait, was a key staging ground for 
the invasion and occupation of Iraq. The Philippines were supported by the US in 
fighting Abu Sayaff while the US also supported Thailand in their fight against the 
Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi.54 Morocco and Pakistan both provided counter 
terrorism cooperation to the US and the latter case provided key transit routes for 
supplies supporting US Forces in Afghanistan.  
 
During this time, the US started to implement a policy of developing partner capability 
so partners could engage in counter-terrorism operations for the benefit of the US.55 
Instead of seeking economic concessions or cooperation at the UN, the US selected these 
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partners based on their willingness to assist. The large number of these cases calls into 
question the Capability Aggregation Model’s assumption that a small state’s lack of 
robust capabilities makes it an inconsequential security partner. For most of these cases, 
internal security forces acting against local militant groups probably provides sufficient 
security benefits to the US, given the global reach of some terrorist organizations. The 
cases also call into question the Autonomy-Security Exchange Model’s assumption that 
smaller partners can only sacrifice autonomy to gain security benefits. Besides 
addressing militancy, small states can also provide valuable, if narrow, security benefits 
such as basing and logistic support due to their geographic locations.  
 
The rapid selection of these cases supports my hypothesis’s assumption that reputation 
can be shaped through short term actions. The Pakistan case, in particular, highlights 
this phenomenon. If reputation was a perception formed over the long term, Pakistan 
probably would not have been selected given the extensive sanctions against Pakistan 
starting in the 1970s and the strong US response to Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear test.  
However, with Pakistan’s immediate cooperation with the US in the days following the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush administration lifted sanctions against Pakistan on 
22 September.56 In other words, 11 days of cooperative behavior at a key time was 
sufficient to overturn over twenty years of US policy sanctioning Pakistan. Continued 
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cooperation in the subsequent years further shaped impressions of Pakistan and was 
sufficient to gain an alliance with the US. 
 
The third case type occurs when a state does not increase its benefit delivery in the years 
prior to alliance selection but does start to deliver benefits in the years after an alliance is 
formed. This case type is consistent with the Autonomy-Security Exchange Model. 
Under this model, reputation is a long term variable and so incurring the autonomy 
costs associated with delivering economic and political benefits prior to an alliance has 
little value. As such, the exchange of these benefits only starts flowing to the larger 
partner once the larger partner has started providing security benefits. The closest case 
to this case type is Israel. In UN Voting for instance, Israel decreased alignment with the 
US by 5% in the years prior to the alliance but increased its alignment by 7% in the years 
following. Meanwhile the value of US arm sales to Israel dipped 30% between the 
baseline period and the years prior to the alliance only to rise by 20% in the years after. 
 
The Israeli case is not a perfect match, however, and is tempered by other elements of 
the data. For instance, even though UN cooperation fell and rose percentage wise, Israel 
still maintained a high degree of alignment, voting with the US 90%, 86%, and 92% of 
the time during the baseline time frame, the years before the alliance, and the years after 
the alliance. This contrasts with the behavior of other close US allies such as Australia 
whose votes aligned with US positions only 73%, 48%, 51% of the time during these 





in the Israel market grew from 75.7% to 99.2% to 99.7%. Meanwhile, Israel’s economic 
relationships with states under sanction were close to steady state between each period. 
At the same time, US net exports fell some 25% after the alliance declaration.  
 
The mixed nature of the measures combined with the high degree of policy alignment 
leads the Israel case to share more characteristics with Type Three or Type One cases, 
depending on the emphasis place on either indicator. If a continually high level of 
alignment is the defining characteristic of the relationship, then the Israeli case is most 
like Type One cases where small states deliver benefits throughout the time period and 
the small state is highly dependent on its larger partner for security provision. If Israel’s 
continued relations with states under US economic sanctions and falling US net exports 
are the defining elements of the relationship in the eyes of the US, the Israel case would 
seem to more closely resemble Type Three cases in which countries provide other 
benefits to the US not capture in the metrics, such as security benefits. In general, the US-
Israeli alliance seems to embody elements of both cases. Israel’s growing isolation from 
European partners and America’s willingness to guarantee Israel’s existence makes 
Israel dependent on US security benefits similar to a Patron-Client relationship. At the 
same time, despite Israel’s small size, it possesses robust capabilities. The reported US-





facilities is one such example where Israel was able to provide the US with narrow yet 
valuable security benefits.57 
 
The final case type occurs when the smaller partner increases benefit delivery in the 
years prior to an alliance declaration and then reduces this benefit delivery in the years 
afterwards. This case fits my hypothesis expectations of a state increasing benefit 
delivery to help develop a reputation of reliability in the eyes of a larger partner and 
subsequently reducing the cost of the relationship by reducing its benefit delivery due to 
the higher cost borne by the larger partner when reducing its provision of security 
benefits as its reputation will suffer across its multiple relationships. 
 
Of the cases examined, Argentina appears to most closely resemble this case type. 
Argentina was selected for MNNA status on 6 January 1998.58 The years studied range 
from 1988-1992, 1993-1997, and 1999-2003, the five years before and after 1998 and a 
baseline period. This time period coincided with a rapid transformation in Argentine 
policy with the election of President Carlos Menem in 1989. During his time in office, 
Menem pursued economic liberalization, an accommodating foreign policy including 
reestablishing diplomatic relations with the UK after they were broken during the 
Falkland Islands War, and pursued military reforms in reaction to the campaign of state 
terrorism during the “Dirty War”. This changing political environment is certainly 
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reflected in a growing alignment of US and Argentine views at the UN and deepening 
economic links. Yet what role did these have in America’s selection of Argentina for 
MNNA status? 
 
An examination of public statements and internal administration documents revealed 
that these shifts in Argentine policy were central to America’s decision to use the 
MNNA designation to reward Argentina and to encourage other countries to look at 
Argentina as a model for reform. The selection for MNNA status was announced during 
President Clinton’s visit to Argentina in October 1997. An internal talking points memo 
specifically mentions shifts in Argentine foreign policy as demonstrated by leading 
international peacekeeping missions as drivers of the selection.59 Public statements 
during the trip by President Clinton demonstrate his perception that the Alliance was a 
multifaceted endeavor featuring cooperative security, foreign, and economic policies. 
Indeed, the main focus on the trip appeared not to be the announcement of an MNNA 
but on securing Argentine support for a free trade agreement to be discussed at the 1998 
Summit of the Americas in Chile.60 The timing of the announcement suggests that the US 
hoped to link increased security provision by the US to increased alignment of 
Argentine economic policies at the upcoming summit. 
 
The public statements also help provide insights into how perceptions of reliability are 
formed. Overall, the Argentine case supports my assumption that reputation is not an 
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inflexible long term measure but can be changed rapidly in the short term through 
consistent cooperative actions. First, the fact that Argentina’s reforms took place starting 
in 1989 and Argentina was selected for an alliance in 1998 demonstrates that the nine 
years of concerted changes in behavior created positive perceptions of reliability. This 
short term formation of reputation was also demonstrated in President Clinton’s address 
to the Argentine armed forces in which he noted the transformation of the military’s 
reputation in a short period of time due to their participation in peacekeeping missions 
around the world.61 This renewed reputation as a humane force for good stands in stark 
contrast with the Argentine military’s campaign of murder and state terror during the 
“Dirty War” which ended only 15 years prior.62 
 
Of note, in the period after the agreement Argentina reduced its support for US policies 
significant. This was primarily driven by 2001 debt crisis and the abandonment of 
neoliberal policies in favor of nationalistic ones.63 Despite this dramatic shift in 
Argentine policy, the US has not rescinded MNNA status for Argentina. This fact, 
suggests that larger powers face constraints in retaliating against smaller partners, 
possible due to the potential costs incurred due to network effects. Overall, the case 
follows my hypothesis closely: by increasing benefit delivery prior to receiving security 
benefits, Argentina’s reputation was viewed more positively by the US which led to 
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alliance formation. Following the alliance, Argentina withdrew its provision of economic 
and political benefits so it could pursue its own policies while the US still maintains 
Argentina’s status as an MNNA.  
 
Driving Variables outside the Study’s Level of Analysis 
 
The study examined state behavior at a macro level in which proxies measured 
aggregate state behavior averaged over several years. As such, this study is ill suited to 
detected delivery of narrow economic or political benefits that are valuable to individual 
political leaders. The Jordanian case appears to closely resemble this scenario. During 
the time studied, Jordan consistently displayed low levels of cooperation with the US at 
the UN and enhanced its economic relations with many states under US unilateral 
sanctions.  
 
However, public statements by the State Department at the time of the selection indicate 
that Jordan’s selection was directly linked to Jordan’s 1994 peace agreement with Israel.64 
Securing the peace agreement was a big win for the administration as Jordan was only 
the second Arab country to recognize Israel. The selection of Jordan as an MNNA and 
the transfer of high-tech weapon systems to the country were used to reward Jordan for 
the agreement. In the Jordanian case the broader proxies used did not capture the 
narrow but very valuable political cooperation that did take place. However, the timing 
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of events suggest that Jordan was able to demonstrate its value as a potential ally in a 
short amount of time and the delivery of political benefits to the US was necessary for an 
alliance to form. 
 
Dynamic internal factors can also become dominate driving factors in state behavior 
unrelated to the pursuit of security benefits. Increasing cooperation during both time 
periods, for instance, may occur when a fundamental shift takes place in the national 
interests of the small state such as during a transition from an autocratic system to a 
democratic one. These changes in regime type could drive changes in political and 
economic behavior that are unrelated to the security benefits provided by the larger 
partner. During central Europe’s transition from Communism to Democracy, for 
instance, national governments generally promoted greater economic openness, 
purchased more Western arms, curbed relationships with bad actors in the international 
system, and more closely aligned with the Western positions at the UN. As democracy 
further consolidated, national interests may have further promoted advancement in 
these areas.  
 
Similar to the constant increase, a constant decrease or steady state could also take place 
as a result of fundamental change in the domestic political environment.  Unlike the first 
case type where increases build on a lower base, the second case type sees decreases in 
cooperation from a higher base. This would be consistent with a political transition from 






The South Korean experience is one possible example of this phenomenon. During the 
baseline period in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the military dictatorship was closely 
aligned with the US. With US control over South Korean Armed Forces, the regime’s 
survival depended on US security support. However, the time period examined from 
1979-1994 was one of turbulent change in South Korea during its transition to 
democracy. In 1980, the US Government allowed the military dictatorship to use 
military force against civilian protestors resulting in the Gwangju Massacre. Following 
the massacre, South Korea saw a sharp rise in anti-Americanism and growing pressure 
on the military dictatorship. By 1987, South Korea held its first free election for the 
Presidency resulting in a more accountable government which reflected the public’s 
negative views of the US.65 By the end of the time period, the US transferred peacetime 
operational control of South Korea military forces from the US to the South Korean 
Government.66 These changes coincided with decreasing cooperation with the US as 
captured by the proxies. Most notably was the falling market share of US arms 
throughout the time period and increasing economic interaction China and with states 
under unilateral US sanction.  
 
South Korean academics note that along with changes in the political situation, growing 
economic and military strength allowed Korea’s autonomy to grow even while the US-
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Korea military relationship continued. This has been driven by South Korea’s economic 
transformation into a modern, developed economy. With growing economic health, 
South Korea did not have to sacrifice autonomy for security. Instead, by increasing its 
own capabilities, South Korea essentially pushed out its autonomy-security trade off 
curve, allowing it to obtain both more autonomy and more security. The academics 
capture this concept in their “Autonomy-Security Simultaneous Promotion Model”.67   
 
The authors, however, fail to discuss why the larger state does not retaliate. One 
possibility is that as the smaller state develops greater capability, the alliance moves 
along a spectrum from a very asymmetric partnership to less asymmetric one. This 
move allows the relationship to take on characteristics more associated with an alliance 
among equals where states focus on enhancing their joint military capabilities rather 
than trading autonomy for security. Again, these fundamental shifts in national interest 
can drive change in state behavior at any time before or after an alliance declaration and 




Asymmetric alliances are critical to understanding our world today as the US confronts 
a series of challenges such as China, Russia, and terrorism. To confront these and other 
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challenges, US policymakers are likely to leverage and expand its network of global 
alliances. Yet, in a resource constrained environment, understanding the benefits 
derived from these relationships will be important when selecting future partners.  To 
address this need, the study sought to examine how states deliver benefits following the 
formation of an alliance and whether these cases conformed to the literature's theoretical 
expectations of state behavior. In examining MNNA political and economic benefit 
delivery, I found that only one MNNA appeared to fit my initial hypothesis while none 
closely fit the Autonomy – Security Exchange model’s expectations. Indeed, a further 
examination of the context surrounding each alliance found that the security arena was 
the main avenue for small states to provide benefits to a larger state. The little 
demonstrated support for both my hypothesis and the literature’s expectations appears 
to be driven by the fact that both assume an asymmetric exchange of benefits. However, 
the cases do tend to support a key difference between my hypothesis and the literatures 
expectations: the short term nature of reputation building. In several cases, such as 
Argentina, Jordan, and Pakistan, states were able to enhance their reputation by shifting 
their behavior to align with the US in the years prior to the alliance declaration. Looking 
forward when evaluating future potential partners, it is important for analysts to 
understand that state behavior can change quickly, providing the basis for a closer 
partnership. In addition, economic or political benefits may be delivered in narrow ways 
which are not captured by macro metrics. Finally, symmetric exchange of benefits may 
take place between asymmetric partners when smaller partners possess key capabilities 





Chapter Three: Lessons Learned Applied 
 
In the last third of this study, I seek to provide a forward looking analysis regarding the 
suitability of India as a future MNNA partner. The US utilizes MNNA designations to 
support partners facing common security challenges. The rise of China is certainly one 
challenge the US and neighboring states will face moving forward. To understand 
India’s suitability, I will first explore the nature of China’s rise and how its growing 
capabilities could threaten the national interests of neighboring states. I will then 
leverage the findings of the first two chapters to examine India’s behavior and whether 
it fit any of the models of state behavior identified earlier.  
 
The United States has long used asymmetric alliances in order to bolster its defense 
needs. During the Cold War, these alliances spread across the globe in order to counter 
the perceived threat of the Soviet Union and Communism in general. In Europe, the 
United States built upon its wartime alliances with the foundation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. NATO cemented US primacy in European defense and allowed for 
the incorporation of a reformed, democratic Germany into the Western effort against the 
Soviet Union. In Asia, the United States concluded alliance treaties with Japan, South 
Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and its former colonial possession, the Philippines.  
 
Meanwhile, the United States pursued informal alliances with other partners in 





several of these partners, including South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Iran to 
ideological foes, the United States continued to pursue partnerships, particularly in the 
Middle East, as the United Kingdom’s drawdown created opportunities for US support 
amongst the Gulf States against Iranian, Iraqi, and Soviet interference. 
 
The end of the Cold War saw the end of the Soviet threat with the splintering of the 
Soviet Union into its constituent Republics, including a significantly weakened Russia. 
This diminished threat perception led to a decline in defense spending as a result of the 
“peace dividend” of the 1990s. With a lowered threat environment, the original purpose 
of many of these alliances was removed. However, the American alliance network 
remained. These alliances played a role in stabilizing the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia and supported containment efforts against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Alliance 
designation was also a tool to reward friends abroad, including Argentina and New 
Zealand for their renewed alignment with US policies.  
 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States quickly brought an end to 
this era of limited threats. Al Qaeda and other violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) quickly 
rose in prominence in the US security dialogue. The alliance network formed during the 
Cold War proved a useful tool for the US response during the invasion of Afghanistan. 
For the first time, Article V of the NATO treaty was invoked with NATO contributing 
troops to US efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. With the subsequent invasion of Iraq, the 





however, failed to quell the threat posed by VNSAs espousing Islamist views. As a 
result, the US continues its military efforts across the region. 
 
The threat posed by VNSAs was and remains a threat that not only endangers the US 
but many partners around the globe. This is particular true for US partners in the 
Muslim world who are threatened not simply by the violence used by these groups but 
by the ideas they espouse. To respond to this threat, the United States sought to further 
bolster its partners engaged with VNSAs.  
 
Since 2001, the US has supported key partners through the MNNA designation. In 2002, 
Bahrain was designated as a Major non-NATO Ally. Bahrain’s strategic location and 
home of US Navy’s Fifth Fleet heightened its importance to the US as US military 
operations increased in the Middle East after 2001. In 2003, the Philippines and 
Thailand, both engaged in counterinsurgency operations against Islamist groups 
received the designation. Since then, only partners in the Muslim world have received 
the designation including Morocco, Pakistan, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Tunisia.  
 
Yet VNSAs are not the only security threat to the United States. Indeed, the challenge 
posed by the People’s Republic of China is in many ways a far greater challenge for the 
US. While VNSAs have the capability to conduct limited attacks against soft targets in 





dominance in the western Pacific. Moreover, as its capabilities continue to grow, China 
may be able to threaten the structure of the US-constructed international system. 
 
With its “Pivot to Asia,” the Obama administration has recognized the centrality of Asia 
to future global growth, that the US is a Pacific power with deep national interests in the 
region, and that growing Chinese capabilities endanger the ability of the US to promote 
rule-of-law governance and freedom of navigation.  
 
As the war on terror has demonstrated, the US has readily used the MNNA designation 
to cultivate partners to work against common security threats. In addressing the 
challenge posed by a rising China, the US may again use this tool to cultivate partners in 
the region. Indeed, many states in Asia are already designated US partners. In Northeast 
Asia, Japan and South Korea are both MNNAs and treaty partners. In the South China 
Sea basin, the Philippines and Thailand are MNNA partners. Finally, on the periphery of 
the region, Australia and New Zealand are also designees.  
 
Moving forward, the US will probably pursue future partnerships in the region, 
including the use of the MNNA designation, to bolster counter-China capabilities. To 
understand which partners the US may choose it is critical to first explore the ways in 
which China’s development threatens US interests in the region and whether states in 






China’s Energy Dilemma 
 
To understand the drivers of Chinese activities I first conducted a review of the available 
literature. A signature piece of this body of work is China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on 
Beijing’s Maritime Policies, an edited volume authored primarily by researchers in the US 
government or at US-based think tanks. The outcome of a Naval War College-sponsored 
conference, the volume is a joint publication of the China Maritime Studies Institute and 
the Naval Institute Press. It provides readers with a good primer and is valuable as a 
proxy for understanding the perception of China’s actions by the United States 
Government.68 
 
For the authors and much of the literature, the core goal of Beijing’s domestic and 
foreign policy is to foster the survival of the Chinese Communist Party. Since the 
reforms of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s and into the 1980s, the CCP’s legitimacy no 
longer rests on Communist ideology but on developing China’s economy. As China has 
grown, it has also grown an enormous appetite for raw resources, most of which cannot 
be sourced domestically. As a result, securing economic growth requires securing access 
to overseas resources.  
 
As the volume address, China is heavily dependent on foreign oil and liquid natural gas 
(LNG) supplies. While domestic production has increased, most of its oil needs are met 
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through supplies from the Middle East and Africa. Compared to US suppliers such as 
Canada and Mexico, the regions China depends upon for supplies feature greater 
instability. This instability increases risks for China at the point of production.  
 
Geography also plays a key role. As China’s key oil partners lie to its west, most of 
China’s oil imports must transit the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. This far 
flung supply train creates vulnerabilities for China. In particular, the Chinese suspect the 
US could use its navy to cut off China’s oil supplies by creating a blockade at the Strait 
of Malacca.  
 
China has sought to reduce this vulnerability in several ways. Creating a national tanker 
fleet to carry its petroleum reduces the ability of other nations to set up an embargo 
short of war since Chinese flagged tankers would be less likely to comply with an 
embargo. 
 
Other efforts to reduce the risk of supply disruption have been more provocative. To 
bypass the Strait of Malacca, the Chinese have strengthened their relationship with 
Burma and Pakistan. These efforts include developing port facilities and planning 
pipelines to feed oil supplies into China. India, however, perceives these efforts and an 






The Chinese have also step up its military capabilities in order to start protecting its 
critical sea lines of communication (SLOC). As observers have noted, the newly acquired 
capabilities outstrip what is need to secure Taiwan during a crisis. A RAND study of 
Chinese air force publications and materials suggest that Chinese force modernization in 
intended for to develop capabilities to project power far beyond Taiwan including the 
capability to strike targets in Japan and even out to Guam.69 
 
However, further naval modernization is necessary to defend its SLOC and so Chinese 
naval operations in the Indian Ocean suggest that the Chinese are developing their 
experience conducting blue water missions. Ultimately, to fully defend its energy 
supplies, China would need to develop a much larger blue water navy capable of 
convoying fuel supplies across the Indian Ocean while engaging the United States in the 
western Pacific during a potential conflict. 
 
Most observers contend that the Chinese currently lack the capability to defend the 
entire SLOC from the Middle East to East Asia. However, efforts to secure Chinese 
control of the South China Sea is a good place to start in this venture as it would allow 
them to secure the part of the SLOC closest to home.  
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Control of the South China Sea would also allow access to natural resources to the east 
of the Strait of Malacca. The US Geological Survey, as part of a 2010 study of Southeast 
Asia, estimated undiscovered oil reserves in roughly the bottom half of the South China 
Sea range between 5 and 22 billion barrels of oil while undiscovered natural gas reserves 
could range between 70 and 290 trillion cubic feet of gas. Meanwhile, other estimates are 
even larger with the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) revealing in 
2012 that it estimates the South China Sea to contain 124 billion barrels of oil and 498 
trillion cubic feet of gas.70 
 
If these estimates prove correct and economically viable, these could be a tremendous 
resource with which to meet Chinese energy needs. In the oil field, when combined with 
China’s current estimated reserves, China would move up from the 14th largest reserve 
holder to 5th, leap frogging energy giants like the US, Russia, UAE, and Iraq. In the gas 
field, China would move up from 11th to 4th with more reserves than the US, Saudi 
Arabia, or UAE. 
 
The ability to tap these reserves, however, is challenging. As the EIA pointed out in 
2013, in order to produce gas from the area “producers would have to construct 
expensive subsea pipelines to carry the gas to processing facilities. Submarine valleys 
and strong currents present formidable geologic problems to effective deep-water gas 
infrastructure. The region is also prone to typhoons and tropical storms, precluding 
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cheaper rigid drilling and production platforms.” Without cooperation from the coastal 
states, Chinese companies would also face the challenge of constructing pipelines over 
several hundred miles to connect platforms in the bottom half of the South China Sea to 
onshore facilities in southern China. The additional expenses may also challenge the 
economic viability of these projects.71  
 
Emerging production technologies, however, mitigate many of these challenges that 
were identified in 2013. In particular, the development of Floating Liquid Natural Gas 
platforms could be revolutionary in this regard. The Shell Prelude, still under 
construction by Samsung Heavy Industries in Geoje, South Korea, will be the first of its 
kind. The Prelude has the ability to extract gas from the seafloor, compress it, store it, 
and transfer the gas to an LNG carrier. By using a floating platform, the Prelude can 
economically extract gas from smaller fields when compared to fixed platforms. The 
design forgoes the use of undersea pipes and on shore processing facilities. Finally, the 
Prelude is designed to withstand extreme environmental conditions, including tropical 
cyclones. When complete, it will be the largest floating facility ever constructed.72  
 
While FLNG facilities could help overcome feasibility challenges, Chinese oil companies 
still remain dependent on international expertise for offshore production, according to 
EIA estimates. The Chinese interest in producing energy in its claimed area despite 
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political disputes and a challenging environment was demonstrated in 2012 when China 
attempted to auction blocks for production within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone.73  
 
These blocks were less than 100nm from the Vietnamese coast. While press reporting 
revealed that the major international oil companies didn’t participate, the effort 
demonstrated that China will move forward in exploiting the area’s energy in the 
exclusive economic zones of neighboring states despite their protests. This dependence 
on international support could have been a factor in CNOOC’s decision to forgo FLNG 
use in the SCS while pushing ahead in the East China Sea. In doing so, they may find 
international partners more willing to produce in a less contested area. The ECS 
production would grow CNOOC’s experience using FLNG while giving the technology 
more time to mature. As it does, the SCS will be a future CNOOC focus area. 
Figure 6. Map of Energy Blocks 
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The figure above demonstrates the areas CNOOC attempted to auction off within 
Vietnam exclusive economic zone.  
 
Meanwhile, China is looking to more than triple its use of natural gas to 10% of its 
energy mix by 2020, according to the EIA. Securing “domestic” resources in the South 
China Sea could help to meet growing demand. Production of energy east of the Strait of 
Malacca, meanwhile, would reduce its vulnerability until the Chinese Navy can defend 
the entire SLOC.  The potential for secure energy access provides a strong incentive for 
assertive behavior when faced with conflict over its East China Sea and South China Sea 
claims.  
 






Capability alone is not the sole determinate of a threat. Indeed, intensions are also 
equally important. For the United States, a China which possesses robust capabilities but 
abides by international norms and seeks to strengthen the institutionalization of 
international relations is a reduced threat. Recent Chinese actions in the South China 
Sea, however, have been viewed by the United States as provocative and a threat to 
freedom of navigation. 
 
The South China Sea is a critical area of navigation for global commerce. It provides a 
route for Middle Eastern oil supplies to enter East Asia. China depends on this route for 
its oil imports while US allies Japan and South Korea also depend upon this crucial sea 
link for its energy needs. Exports from East Asia to key markets to the west including 
South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe also depend on the free transit of 
vessels through the South China Sea. India’s burgeoning trade with Southeast Asia also 
depends upon this area.  
 
Since the end of the Second World War, the US Navy has provided security for the area 
through regular patrols and cooperation with close partners. Economic control of the 
area, however, has been contested with many rival claimants including China, Vietnam, 
the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Bruneian. The latter three base their claims on 
interpretations of the Law of the Sea with some areas of overlap. The Chinese, however, 
base their claim on historic sovereignty of the area. Their nine-dashed line claims almost 





such a way would increase Chinese access to potential hydrocarbon resources in the 
area and allow them to regulate shipping for their benefit and to the determinant of 
rivals such as Japan.  
Figure 7. Areas of Dispute in the South China Sea
 
The figure above demonstrates the conflict claims to waters in the South China Sea. 74 
 
Chinese efforts to enforce these claims by reclaiming land atop submerged reefs  in the 
Spratly Islands appears to directly challenge US interests in the area. By attempting a de 
facto annexation of what the US has characterized as a global commons and presenting 
the US with a fait accompli, the Chinese have adopted a much more assertive approach. 
                                               
74. "Assessing Threats to U.S. Vital Interests," 2015 Index of US Military Strength, Ed. Dakota Wood, 






With the issue developing rapidly over the past year, much of the literature is too old to 
provide insight on this shift in Chinese policy and what the impact is on regional states. 
As such, an observer is left to gauge the situation through contradictory statements by 
the US and Chinese governments. The Chinese claim that the islands are sovereign 
territory and that the installations, including lighthouses, are for civilian and public use. 
The US meanwhile claims that the islands are for military purposes and are artificially 




To understand the nature of Chinese efforts to enforce its claims, below, I undertake a 
geospatial study of reefs in the South China Sea which reportedly have seen increased 
Chinese activity over the past several years. These include Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross 
Reef, Johnson Reef, Gaven Reef, Subi Reef, and Cuarteron Reef. The study relied on 
readily available multispectral commercial satellite imagery of the area collected 
between 2004 and 2015. By comparing a series of images to each other and identifying 
key equipment within the images, the study will characterize the nature of change at 
these reefs. Identification of vessels by their class or even hull number was based on 
Chinese order of battle information published by the Office of Naval Intelligence.75 
Overall, the study reveals that the construction is being undertaken by the Chinese with 
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support from the Chinese military, the activity provides significant military capabilities 
to the Chinese, and enhances the military threat to US interests and regional states.    
 
The reefs in question are located in the southern part of the South China Sea in the 
Spratly Islands group. They create a roughly rectangular area of influence proximately 
160 nautical miles (nm) by 70 nm, covering some 9600 square nautical miles. The closest 
reef in this group to China, Subi Reef, is approximately 500nm from the southern tip of 
Hainan. Meanwhile the closest reef to the Philippines, Mischief Reef, is approximately 
130nm from Palawan Island. Mischief Reef is also the closest in the group to Malaysia at 
190nm. Cuarteron Reef is the closest in the group to Brunei at approximately 260nm. 
Finally, the closest reef in the group to mainland Vietnam, Fiery Cross Reef, is 
approximately 250nm away. At the very least, Chinese occupation of these reefs is 
occurring within the 200nm exclusive economic zones of the Philippines and Malaysia 
while the others could lie in the continental shelf claims of regional states. 
 




Mischief Reef is a circular reef surrounding a lagoon approximately 4.0nm wide. It is 
located approximately 130nm from the Philippines and 590nm from Hainan, China. It is 
the easternmost island in the group of seven. The earliest image of the reef was collected 





part of the reef. The platform featured several structures and was possibly supported by 
an array of solar panels. In the lagoon, the Chinese had moored a probable HAIJIAN 
coast guard vessel and an unidentified vessel. Subsequent imagery from March 2005 and 
March 2012 revealed that the Chinese continued to place Coast Guard vessels including 
a HAIJIAN coast guard vessel in the lagoon with the accompanying support of a 
Chinese Navy FUJIAN oil transporter. By January 2015, Coast Guard vessels were no 
long present in the area and were replaced by major Chinese Navy surface combatants. 
On imagery from 6 January 2015 a JIANGHU I-class frigate was located in the lagoon.  
 
By last available imagery from 31 January 2015, a dredger had arrived near the platform 
and had reclaimed approximately one acre of land. In addition, the Jinggang Shan (Hull 
999) arrived and was stationed approximately 1km southeast of a dredging operation. 
The inclusion of the Jinggang Shan in the station party is significant as the vessel is a 
YUZHAO-class amphibious warfare vessel capable of deploying one marine battalion 
and their amphibious assault vehicles. It is one of the largest vessels in the Chinese Navy 
and is central to China’s capabilities to project force ashore. In addition, the JIANGHU I-







Figure 8. Land reclamation at Mischief Reef
 
The above image from 1 January 2015 revealed Chinese reclamation activity 
underway. Imagery provider: Google, Digital Globe. 
 
Figure 9. Jinggang Shan (Hull 999) on station at Mischief Reef 
 
The above image from 1 January 2015 revealed the Jinggang Shan, an amphibious 
assault ship on station at Mischief Reef. Imagery provider: Google, Digital Globe. 
 






The above image from 1 January 2015 revealed a JIANGHU I-class frigate, uploaded 
with antiship cruise missiles, on patrol near at Mischief Reef. Imagery provider: 
Google, Digital Globe. 
 
Fiery Cross Reef 
 
The rectangular Fiery Cross Reef is on the western edge of the Spratly Island group and 
is closest to mainland Vietnam some 250nm to the west. The earliest available imagery 
was collected on 15 March 2014 and revealed the existence of a small platform atop the 
reef. West of the reef was positioned one YUKAN-class tank landing ship along with one 
dredging vessel. No dredging operations were underway.  
 
By imagery collected on 22 November 2014, a large dredging operation was underway 
with six dredgers operating in an artificially constructed harbor on the reef. 





west of the reef, one JIANGKAI II class guided missile frigate was providing security for 
the operation.  
 
By 4 March 2015, the Chinese were continuing their dredging operation with five 
dredgers operating in the manmade harbor. Construction was underway on buildings 
and infrastructure while enough land had been reclaimed to support the construction of 
a 3300-meter runway. A total of approximately 610 acres had been reclaimed. 
Meanwhile a JIANGKAI II class guided missile frigate was positioned approximately 
1.0nm east of the Chinese outpost. 
 
Figure 11. Fiery Cross Reef Prior to Reclamation 
 
 
The above image from 30 May 2014 shows the reef prior to Chinese reclamation 
activity. Imagery provider: Google, Digital Globe. 
 






The above image from 4 March 2015 revealed a runway under construction with 
extensive land reclamation completed. Imagery provider: Google, Digital Globe. 
 
Figure 13. Priority Reclamation
 
The above image from 4 March 2015 reveals that by utilizing four dredgers at once, 
the Chinese were probably attempting to proceed quickly with land reclamation. 








Johnson Reef is a u-shaped reef located in the middle of the Spratly Island group 
approximately equidistant from the Philippines and Vietnam. In the center of the reef is 
a small lagoon of protected water. The earliest available image was collected on 16 
February 2006 and revealed a 25 meter by 50 meter platform moored to the reef and 
supported by a 72-meter pier. One JIANGHU I-class frigate was located approximately 
two nm northeast of the installation.  
 
By 16 December 2012, the pier had been removed and the platform remained. By 29 June 
2014, 25 acres of land had been reclaimed. The reclamation effort was supported by the 
Danxia Shan (Hull 934), a YUTLING II-class landing ship. Additionally, a JIANGHU I-
class frigate provided security. By 22 October 2014, the reclamation efforts had been 
completed and the construction of support infrastructure was underway. By 3 March 
2015, several buildings were externally complete, a pier was installed and several other 
construction projects were underway. Meanwhile, a probable JIANGHU I UPGRADE-
class frigate was stationed approximately .70nm northeast of the construction. A second 
Chinese warship, a JIANGWEI II-class frigate was located at the entrance to the lagoon 








Gaven Reef is circular and approximately one kilometer across. It is closest to 
Philippines at just over 200nm to the west. The earliest available imagery was collected 
on 16 December 2012 and revealed that a small 22 x 55 meter platform had been 
constructed on the reef. The platform featured a small support building and a helicopter 
landing pad. By 22 October 2014, approximately 24 acres had been reclaimed and 
infrastructure constructed. This included several support buildings and the start of a 120 
meter pier. The lack of dredgers in the area suggested that any land reclamation activity 
had already concluded. While no Chinese navy vessels were in the immediate vicinity, 
the JIANGHU I-class frigate positioned at Johnson Reef was 28nm to the south. By 9 
March 2015, seawalls around the reclaimed land were nearly complete while 
construction of the pier continued with one crane. Again, no Chinese navy vessels were 




The first available image from 8 March 2005 revealed a 15 x 35 meter platform and 
building were constructed on top of the reef. The outpost featured a circular helipad. By 
2 July 2014, the platform was nearly doubled in size to accommodate the construction of 
a 20-meter radome. The images do not reveal the system housed in the radome. A 
DAYUN-class general stores issue ship was located outside the lagoon approximately .7 
nautical miles north of the station while a YUKAN-class tank landing ship (LST) was 





efforts continued with two dredgers operating in the lagoon. A YUKAN-class LST was 
again stationed in the area.  
 
Figure 14. Increasing Intelligence Capabilities 
 
The above image highlights the newly constructed probable maritime surveillance 
station. Imagery provider: Google, Digital Globe. 
 
Cuarteron Reef  
The oval reef covers an area approximately 5.25 km long by 1.25 km wide and is 





bit over 250nm away for each. First available imagery of the reef was collected by Digital 
Globe on 7 March 2014. A 50 meter x 20 meter platform was installed on the reef with a 
small building installed similar in design to other Chinese constructed buildings in the 
Spratly Island group. A 22-meter shelter appeared to cover the platform’s pier. 
Approximately 380 meters north of the platform, one dredger was in operation and had 
already reclaimed nearly an acre of land.  
 
By 26 February 2015, 56 acres had been reclaimed, seawalls constructed around the 
reclaimed land, and an artificial harbor built. The main pier in the artificial harbor can 
accommodate vessels approaching 100 meters. Chinese naval vessels were not observed 
on either image. 
 
Capabilities Gained by the Reef Development 
 
As demonstrated by the above discussion, the Chinese increasingly militarized its claims 
in the South China Sea. The earliest images from these reefs reveal that the Chinese were 
already occupying the reefs with small platforms. The small size of the installations 
provided little capability besides as a tool to assert China's sovereignty over the area. 
From these early images collected in 2004, Chinese interests were defended by isolated 






However, there was a shift with the introduction of Chinese Navy vessels. The first 
noted deployment was at Mischief reef in 2005 when a Navy oilier was seen near the 
coast guard vessel. The addition of the oiler probably allowed the Chinese to increase 
the length of deployments to the area. By 2006, the first Chinese naval surface combatant 
was observed, a JIANGHU I-class frigate at Johnson reef. However, it was not until 2014 
that a large influx of Chinese combatants was introduced to the area to protect the start 
of dredging operations. These included the JIANGWEI II frigate, a vessel equipped with 
advanced antiship cruise missiles and surface to air missiles. China also deployed the 
Jinggang Shan, one of China’s largest amphibious assault ships capable of quickly 
deploying its contingent of marines and their armored vehicles ashore. 
 
Besides the increased presence of Chinese naval vessels, the facilities themselves provide 
a strong increase in Chinese capabilities to the area. With Chinese control of other reefs 
in the area, the Chinese selection of these particular reefs is probably to maximize their 
capabilities. The probable maritime surveillance station on Subi Reef guards the 
northern approach to this group, the most direct route for approaching US Navy assets 
mustering out of Japan. The construction of berthing locations and support structures on 
the other reefs provide a partial defensive ring around the airstrip at Fiery Cross. From 
these locations, patrol vessels could be dispatched to intercept approaching enemies. If 
coastal defense cruise missiles or surface to air missiles were installed, the Chinese 






The size of the landing strip at Fiery Cross is impressive, allowing the Chinese to 
support Il-78 tanker operations if need be.76 By staging tanker aircraft and a multirole 
fighter, the Chinese Air Force or the naval aviation wing of the Chinese Navy could 
perform a wide range of missions including maritime targeting in the area. As Fisher 
notes, one of the newer multirole fighters in the Chinese inventory, the SU-30MKK has 
“an impressive reach due to its aerial refueling capability. Its advertised unrefueled 
radius of 1,600km extends to 2,600km with one aerial refueling and to 3,495km with 
another.”77 When launched from Fiery Cross without tanker support, an SU-30 could 
target any ship operating in the Strait of Malacca, freeing tankers for other missions 
during a conflict. If tanker support was available, SU-30s from Fiery Cross could target 
the Indian vessels and aircraft attached to the Andaman and Nicobar Command. The 
Command is located on a small chain of islands close to Indonesia and is responsible for 
controlling the entrance to the Strait of Malacca.78 These aircraft could also target distant 
US military installations in the area including US facilities at Guam and Darwin, 
Australia if supported by refueling on the way to and from the target. 
 
In addition, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance missions could also operate out 
`of Fiery Cross. For instance, a CH-4 UAV – similar to the US Reaper UAV – has a 
reported range of 3,500km and 40 hour flight time. This would allow the UAV to reach 
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the Strait of Malacca, the Java Sea, and waters east of the Philippines, loiter, and return 
to base. The drone could also perform kinetic missions with its four to six missiles.  79 
During peacetime, UAV missions from Fiery Cross could conduct surveillance of US or 
regional naval activity or could be used in counter piracy operations in the Strait of 
Malacca. During war, UAV missions would help China find, fix, and track enemy forces 
in order to vector combat aircraft or naval vessels towards the target. Monitoring 
developments in neighboring states would also be increased. 
 
 Public Interest in the South China Sea 
 
While these military threats are certainly concerning to states in the region, the South 
China Sea is distant from the US. As the US lacks claims in the area, the US willingness 
to act on these developments and pursue additional allies must be based on sustained 
interest in countering Chinese actions there. Public statements by the US Government 
certainly given the impression of US interest in countering Chinese actions. Yet, how can 
researchers tell whether the issue will generate a long term US response? Private 
conversations with key US policymakers could provide insights into US willingness to 
act. Securing these conversations and then publishing them for attribution, however, is a 
more challenging matter.  
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Another method to gauge whether a long term commitment is likely is if there is a 
sustained public interest in the topic helping maintain US action across administrations. 
Pursuing alliances with regional states would be more likely with continued interest 
than without. To gauge interest in the topic, I conducted an analysis of Google search 
data to determine the extent to which the public is engaged on the topic. 
 
An analysis of worldwide Google search trends from 2004-present revealed a significant 
spike in interest on the subject over the past four years, reflecting the rising tension in 
the area. The search term “South China Sea” ebbed between 11-35 percent of the 
maximum interest during this time period from January 2004 and April 2011. Since May 
2011, with the Vietnamese-Chinese clash over an oil rig, the interest spiked. Between 
May 2011 and present, the issue has remained at a higher plateau of 19% and reached its 
highest level of interest in May 2015. The trends suggest the global public is increasingly 
focused on the issue. Meanwhile, besides regional states, the top ten interested countries 
on the subject included Australia, India, and the United States. A breakdown of interest 







Figure 15. Google Trends Analysis, “South China Sea” 
 
 
The above figure shows increasing interest in the search term “South China Sea” over 
time.  
 
Meanwhile, data on users in the United States revealed that there was a smaller spike in 
interest during May 2011 and a smaller plateau in interest levels until spikes in March 
2014 and May 2015 due to heightened tension in the region. A breakdown of this data by 
region is also revealing with Hawaii, home of US Pacific Command, showing the highest 
interest in the subject. The District of Columbia was a close second while Maryland and 
Virginia were the next highest yet only with half as much interest. 
 







The above figure shows increasing interest in the search term “South China Sea” over 
time with interest concentrated in Hawaii and the Washington, DC metropolitan area.  
 
Analysis of trend data comparing the relative interest of “south china sea” and 
“terrorism” for users in the District of Columbia also revealed an increasing focus on the 
issue. While “terrorism” is consistently of higher interest since 2004, it has undergone a 
precipitous decline since its peak in April 2004. Meanwhile, relative interest in the 
“south china sea” has emerged from negligible interest to low but sustained interest 
during the summer of 2014 and 2015.  
 







The above figure shows that interest in the search term “terrorism” dramatically fell 
while relative interest in “South China Sea” achieved sustained levels as of late.  
 
As individual perceptions are to some degree shaped by broader society, our perception 
of reality is certainly influenced by our interactions with others. In its simplest form, the 
search trends show a growing use of Google searches to discover information about the 
South China Sea relative to terrorism by users in a geographic area over time. However, 
as key policymakers live and work in the Washington metropolitan area, their 
perceptions of the growing relative importance of South China Sea issues is probably 
shaped by these trends through their interaction with other Washingtonians and media 
content. As policymaker awareness and interest in South China Sea topics grow, 
sustained US Government action on the issue is more likely to occur. 
 
I also tried to understand if these issues are becoming increasingly important in China. 
To do so, I analyzed Google trends in China for 南海 or “South Sea”. The search trends 





provinces bordering the South China Sea. This suggests that the searches were unrelated 
to disputes in the South China Sea but rather for other reasons such as economic 
interests, weather forecasts, etc. 
 
As a proxy, I used trend data for bilingual Singapore to compare English and Chinese 
language interest in the topic. Singapore’s data is also helpful as their use of the search 
term is probably for less varied reasons than users living near the actual body of water. 
The data revealed that while English language interest was relatively more intense, 
Chinese language searches followed the general trend of English language interest, 
spiking together during periods of heightened tension in the South China Sea. This 
mirrored relationship suggests that Chinese and English speakers are both following the 
issue at key moments and that Chinese language sources on the issue are available and 
accessed during heightened tensions. 
 







The above figure shows that Singaporean interest in the Chinese and English search 
terms for the South China Sea tracked closely with one another, suggesting Chinese 
language sources are covering the issue similarly.   
 
Overall, these trends suggest that there has been an increased shift in global awareness 
in South China Sea issues since 2011 and that this interest probably is increasing 
amongst policymakers in Washington and at US Pacific Command. Furthermore, the 
Chinese-language trends suggest that the tensions are covered to a similar by degree in 
Chinese-language sources as English sources. This coverage probably influences 
perceptions in the PRC regarding the importance of South China Sea issues. Increasing 
engagement on the topic by the public and policymakers on both sides of the tension 
certainly could drive US efforts to cultivate regional partners to support its positions.  
 
Thoughts on the US Response 
 
As the above discussion has indicated, Chinese development in the South China Sea has 
increased the threat to US forces operating in the area. The airstrip on Fiery Cross could 
support robust ISR missions designed to find and fix US naval assets operating in the 
area. During wartime, this same installation could be used to target US assets in Guam, 
Australia, and naval assets operating in the Indian Ocean. With the geographic reality of 






A strong Chinese presence would help isolate Taiwan during a crisis. The Chinese could 
also use their position to conduct a distant blockade of Japan or South Korea by 
interdicting oil tankers heading from the Middle East to the US partners. In addition, if 
the Chinese are able to exploit energy in contested South China Sea areas the Chinese 
would threaten key international norms such as respect for the exclusive economic 
zones of others and freedom of navigation. These actions would undermine the basis of 
the international system the US has developed since World War II. Finally, the ability of 
the Chinese to source their energy needs from locations west of the Strait of Malacca 
would remove the leverage gained by the US through a blockade of Chinese energy 
imports during a crisis.  
 
Given the stakes at hand and the increased interest by global and US audiences in the 
South China Sea issue, the US is likely to respond by increasing its capabilities in the 
area, defying Chinese assertion of authority, and developing partnerships in the area to 
resist Chinese moves. On the first two measures, the US has made concrete progress. 
The first deployments of the US Navy’s new littoral combat ship, designed to operate in 
coastal areas, was to the region. The US Navy has also declared publicly its intention to 
restart freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea in order to demonstrate that 
the US does not recognize the legitimacy of China’s actions.  
 
On the third measure, some progress has been made in renewing existing partnerships. 





Philippine interest in inviting the United States back to Subic Bay, once the largest 
overseas US military base until its closure in the early 1990s. Access to Subic Bay would 
provide the United States a large naval base directly on the South China Sea. However, 
as the Times noted, a preliminary agreement to expand base access in other areas of the 
country has been bogged down by opposition legal cases. The Philippines’ continued 
military weakness may necessitate the need for additional partnerships. 
 
The Indian Case 
Perception of Chinese Threat 
 
India and China, the two great civilizational powers in Asia, with over a billion people 
each, will be key players in Asia during the 21st Century. With such large populations, 
both have a growing need for energy imports and the ability to export products to 
overseas markets. As such, the strength of these two giants will depend upon their 
access to the sea. With the growing economic strength of East Asia, India’s focus east 
through the Strait of Malacca has led it to develop regional ties in Southeast Asia. 
Meanwhile, China’s growing energy dependence has led to a growing focus on its 
energy suppliers west of the Strait of Malacca. These geographic realities foster an 
environment in which an economic competition over Southeast Asia and a security 
competition over key shipping routes in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean 






The potential for an adversarial relationship is not a recent development but one based 
in history. During the British Raj, the predecessor of the contemporary Indian state, the 
colonial government sustained a string of buffer states in the Himalayas in order to 
separate the two powers. With the fall of Tibet to the Chinese in the early 1950s, 
however, post-independence India would share a long boundary in the west. This 
border would spark the Chinese-Indian border war in 1962. The defeat of Indian forces 
during the conflict is still deeply embedded in the psyche of the Indian Armed Forces, 
according to the literature.8081 
 
The rejection of the West by India after independence led to a growing relationship with 
the Soviet Union. The Chinese sought to counter this relationship by strengthening ties 
to India’s arch-rival Pakistan. As Singh highlights, continued ties between Pakistan and 
China, including assistance in the aerospace and nuclear fields, do little to challenge 
India’s perception of a “China Threat”.82 
 
Chinese actions in the Indian Ocean have also been of growing concern to the Indian 
military establishment. The development of Gwadar, Pakistan as a major port is 
perceived in India as an attempt to create a naval base in waiting. Increasing Chinese 
development assistance to Burma, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka has taken on similar fears. 
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Press reporting in mid-2015 that China was negotiating with Djibouti to establish a naval 
base, is surely interpreted in a similar manner. A base in Djibouti, in particular, would 
provide the basis for a continuous Chinese naval Indian-ocean presence at a key 
geographic location.83  
 
Chinese activity at the European entrance to the Indian Ocean strikes directly at India’s 
own Great Power ambitions. During the time of the Raj, India was the central hub of a 
vast economic system connecting far flung markets from South Africa, to the Persian 
Gulf, to Singapore. Meanwhile, the Indian Navy, under command of British officers, 
provided security to this maritime region.  
 
India’s weakness and socialist leanings following independence led to an inward focus 
until the early 1990s. As India’s economy has grown, so has its yearning for great power 
status. There has been an increased focus of leaving the subcontinent behind as India’s 
strength relative to Pakistan continues to expand. For elements of the Indian naval 
community, there has been a drive to develop maritime capabilities to project Indian 
power deep into the Indian Ocean. These capabilities would allow India to protect its 
interests and ultimately such a Navy would be able to control each of the entrances to 
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the Indian Ocean: the Strait of Malacca, the Mandeb Strait between Yemen and Djibouti, 
and Mozambique Channel.84 
 
To support these ambitions, there has been a large increase in naval spending. Indeed, 
the shift from Pakistan to Indian Ocean security concerns demonstrated with the large 
increase in the Navy’s percentage of overall defense spending. This spending is 
ultimately aimed at developing a three fleet navy, each equipped with a carrier strike 
group. Its drive to control the entrances to the Indian Ocean is also underway. On the 
remote Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India has been building its military presence. 
The islands are only 50 miles from Indonesia and provide a forward basing option that 
allows India to quickly drive into the Strait of Malacca.  
 
India has also worked to strengthen its military ties to Singapore. Wary of being seen as 
a Chinese outpost, the Singaporeans have focused on developing ties with both India 
and the United States. As a result of this close interaction, Singaporean forces now 
conduct ground and air training on Indian ranges. Research and development 
cooperation is underway and the two forces exchange intelligence. The Indians also 
have basing access which facilitates a continued presence at the eastern entrance to the 
Strait of Malacca. Annual military exercises between the two forces have grown in scope, 
with the 2011 iteration taking place in the South China Sea. Finally, both countries in 
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winter 2015 released joint statements with the United States on the South China Sea 
issues, stating that the dispute should be handled peaceably through the Law of the Sea, 
positions directly in contradiction to China’s stance.8586 
 
Finally, India has worked to strengthen its cooperation with other US allies. Its 
relationship with Japan, in particular, has strengthened across several fronts. The 
Japanese have increased their direct investment and development assistance to India. 
The military forces of both countries have conducted training exercises together. 
Cooperation with the Japanese furthermore provides a potential mechanism for India to 




As India’s relative power to the United States in the CINC score falls far below the 
threshold of a symmetric relationship, it’s appropriate to evaluate India’s actions 
through the lens of an asymmetric relationship. As such, I will examine what change has 
taken place in India’s behavior in recent years by leveraging leverage the proxy 
measures previously used to evaluate the behavior of MNNA partners. For the proxy 
measures for political benefits, I examined India’s UN voting affinity to US positions 
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and their economic relationships with States targeted by US unilateral sanctions. For the 
proxy measures for economic benefits, I examined India’s trade relationship with US 
and its purchases of US military equipment. 
 
For UN Voting, I first examined a constructed short term period consisting of the last 
five years of available data: 2010-2014. The affinity scores for each of these years were 
averaged with India having an affinity score of approximately 17%. While low, this 
score is similar to the scores for Afghanistan and Egypt in the run up to their 
designation as a MNNA.  
 
Next, I constructed a baseline of behavior by using the five years prior to the above short 
term period. I averaged the affinity scores for 2005-2009. This showed that on average 
during this baseline period India had an affinity score of affinity score 11%. Again this is 
a low level of agreement. However, with this low baseline, India’s 17% affinity during 
the short term composite is a 53% increase in India’s affinity. 
 
This increase in agreement, however, could be due to changes in US behavior rather 
than India’s. For instance, if India’s voting on certain issues remain static while US 
voting patterns change, this could also produce a position change in affinity to the US 
without revealing conscious Indian efforts. To further examine this, I constructed a 
second, weighted measure for UN voting affinity. To do this, I also created averages for 





each year by subtracting the global affinity score. For instance, in 2014, India agreed 
with the US approximately 20% of the time while the global average was approximately 
35%. By weighting the scores, the measure better accounts for shifts in US positions as 
reflected by changes to average global agreement. Through this process, I found that in 
the baseline period India agreed with the US 8 points less than the global average. 
During the short term period, India’s affinity levels fell to 15 points less than the global 
average. This suggests that while India’s affinity for US positions increased in raw 
terms, it actually fell compared to the global average.  
 
In my analysis of existing MNNAs, I created and examined a second political proxy 
measure which captured the trade relationships between allies and states under US 
sanction. Unfortunately, the Correlates of War project only contains trade data between 
states up until 2009. For the follow on economic proxy covering US-India trade, I was 
able to supplement the Correlates of War data with data from the US Census 
Department covering the relationship. However, similar data is not available for India’s 
bilateral relationships with sanctioned states. The data which is available from the 
Indian government is based on an April-March fiscal year. As the data is not broken 
down by month, I was unable to reconstruct comparable figures to supplement the 
Correlates of War data.  
 
In addition to political benefits, I also examined India’s delivery of economic benefits. 





relationship. This data utilized the Correlates of War data set and for the years 2009-
2014, I used the Census Department’s trade data information on the US-India 
relationship. For this measure, I again constructed a baseline measure and a short term 
measure by averaging the years 2005-2009 and 2010-2014, respectively. During the 
baseline period, the US-India trade relationship averaged roughly $35 billion a year. By 
the short term period, trade had increased to $54 billion, or approximately 54%. Yet, 
how directed was this increase? 
 
One factor which impacts the nature of US and Indian products is the competitiveness of 
US and Indian products to potential customers. If US and Indian products increase their 
quality and competitiveness compared to other countries, then the trade relationship can 
thicken without government direction or support. To get a sense of this factor, I 
examined the combined trade relationship between the US and the world and India and 
the world. For the US during the baseline time period, the trade relationship with the 
world was $3.8 trillion. By the second time period, the trade relationship increased to 
$4.8 trillion, or approximately 26%. Indian figures for this time period could not be 
determined as the available data from the Indian treasure for this time period is 
measured on an April-March calendar year and lacks monthly data to construct a 
January-December accounting of trade activity. However, the US information suggests 







I examined the trade data again to determine which partner accumulated the most 
benefits from the relationship. Generally, exports are considered more desired than 
imports by political leaders and publics. As such, a growing positive balance of trade for 
the US would indicate that US was capturing the majority of the economic benefits. I 
again constructed a baseline time period by averaging the balance of trade for the year 
as 2005-2009. I also constructed a short term measure by averaging data for 2010-2014. 
My analysis revealed that during the baseline period, per year, the US imported $10.4 
billion more worth of Indian goods than it exported. By the short term period, the trade 
deficit had grown by approximately 68% to $17.4 billion.   
 
One explanation for this growing budget deficit is that the US increased its imports 
worldwide due to factors beyond the US-India relationship such as the strength of the 
US dollar relative to other currencies or the general growth in importing manufactured 
goods. My analysis of the data revealed that during the baseline period, the US had a 
trade deficit of $654.8 billion per year, on average. During the 2nd time period, the 
average US trade deficit fell 22% to approximately $513.4 billion. India’s ability to 
increase its net exports to the US while the rest of the world’s net exports to the US fell 
by more than a quarter suggests that India captured the bulk to the trade benefits during 
both time periods and was further increasing its share during the second time period. 
 
I also examined military trade data between the US and India as the fourth proxy. 





increase interoperability between forces, open the door for military-to-military training 
opportunities, and create long term dependences for the purchaser. However, there are 
also economic benefits which make military sales an important consideration in the 
relationship. First, military items are purchased directly by the state. As such, the state 
can direct their purchases towards politically important partnerships if comparable 
equipment is being offered by multiple suppliers. This direct control and the often 
politicized nature of military equipment purchases contrasts with the more limited 
control a government has over the broader trade relationship with partners. These 
economic benefits are also deep in that the tail of military equipment is lengthy with 
maintenance support, spare parts, and upgrades typically needed over the multi decade 
life span of some advanced military equipment.  
 
With rising military budgets, India has had an opportunity to reward the United States 
with military contracts for new equipment. To understand if this took place, I turned to 
the data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. I constructed 
a short term measure, averaging the sales amount in millions of 1990 US Dollars from 
2010-2014. This was compared to a baseline measure constructed of an average sales 
figure for 2005-2009. My analysis found that in the baseline period, the US sales per year 
averaged approximately 44 million 1990 dollars. By the 2nd time period, however, the US 
sales per year averaged approximately 1.03 billion 1990 dollars. This is approximately a 






To discern whether the increase in sales reflected the development of a long term 
relationship, I examined what equipment was being purchased during this time period. 
Offensive equipment sales could suggest a deeper level of trust compared to defense 
equipment.  During the baseline period, the main sales were of defensive equipment 
such as the P-8 POSEIDON, an aircraft designed to detect enemy submarines, and 
counter-battery radar systems. In the past five years, however, there was a switch to 
offensive equipment such as the AH-64 APACHE attack helicopter and advanced land 
attack cruise missiles.88 
 
The expanding sales of military equipment from the US to India suggest that the Indian 
government is directing economic benefits to the United States. An alternative 
explanation for the increase is that the equipment offered by the US became unusually 
attractive to overseas buyers during this time period. To examine this possibility I 
developed an average global market share figure for both the baseline and short term 
periods. This was done by leveraging the SIPRI’s data on exports from all countries. This 
found that during the baseline period the US global market share was approximately 
30% and that by the short term period, the US had increased its market share to 31%.  
 
The slow growth in global market shares suggests that the US only became slightly more 
competitive than other exporters. However, the expanding value of military sales could 
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have occurred if India was simply purchasing more equipment from all its suppliers as 
part of a booming budget. To examine this factor, I examined US market share in the 
Indian military market. My analysis revealed that US market share increased from only 
approximately 2% during the baseline period to approximately 12% during the short 
term period or a 6 times increase.  
 
These various measures revealed that India directed its military imports towards 
America, resulting in increased economic benefits for the US. This trend can be explains 
in some degree due to the slight increase in US global competitiveness and to a larger 
degree to increasing Indian budgets overall. However, the rapid increase in market 
share and the more advanced items sold by the US reflect an increasingly sophisticated 
partnership. 
 
Overall, India’s scores are suggestive of a deepening relationship. The arms trade data 
was particularly impressive given the rapid increase in US arms sales and market share. 
If India was designated a MNNA, India would be eligible for further sales of even more 
sophisticated equipment and training. The UN affinity levels were surprising low given 
that India has been characterized by US administrations as an important democratic 
partner and one which shares common values with the US.89 However, the study of 
existing MNNA behavior suggests that this low level of cooperation at the UN is not a 
barrier to eventual selection given the case of Egypt and Kuwait.  
                                               






The ultimate decision to select India as an MNNA, however, will face greater hurdles on 
the Indian side rather than the US. As Karim points out, the US has sought to develop 
Indian strength into that of a great power with the Defense Department undertaking 
ever more complex exercises with their Indian counterparts.90 Domestic opposition in 
India, however, is a likely stumbling block. Therefore, both sides may continue to 
deepen the relationship to the level of a defacto alliance if a formal declaration proves to 
be politically unfeasible. 
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The Ground Covered 
 
This study examined the nature of asymmetric alliances. As conceptualized by the 
literature, these alliances feature both an asymmetry of power and interests. For 
powerful states in an asymmetric relationship, the literature expects that they will trade 
their security surplus to gain political or economic benefits from their smaller partner. 
The smaller partner, by contrast, has a security deficit and so must trade political or 
economic benefits to the larger state. 
 
The literature’s study of reputation as a factor suggests that a larger state is more likely 
to follow through on its delivery of security benefits. A larger state’s behavior in one 
relationship impacts its reputation in the eyes of other partners. If it fails to follow 
through in one relationship, it will be viewed as less reliable by others. As the value of a 
partnership depends upon the expectation that allies will follow through on their 
commitments, a large state which fails to follow through in its relations with one partner 
can suffer costs in each of its other relations. Therefore, with its prestige engaged, a large 
state is likely to deliver its security benefits in order to avoid degrading its other 
relationships. 
 
However, the smaller partner faces incentives to underperform. As a rational actor, a 





states in this pursuit is an asymmetric focus on the relationship. Smaller states generally 
contend with a smaller foreign policy portfolio than large states.  As such, policymakers 
from smaller states can leverage this additional mental bandwidth to focus on 
maximizing its gains from the relationship. Policymakers from larger states, by contrast, 
are forced to address a variety of serious global issues rather than concentrate on a 
single partner.  
 
The nature of asymmetric alliances has particular importance for US policymakers. Since 
WWII, the United States has built a network of alliances in order to counter the 
challenges it confronts on the global stage.  Moving forward, the development of 
additional asymmetric alliances is a likely course of action as new challenges arise. 
Therefore, a deeper understanding of the benefits gained from current alliances can help 
ensure a more realistic assessment of the benefits provided by additional partners. 
 
The literature’s understanding of asymmetric alliances features key gaps, however. 
While the literature theorizes that asymmetric alliances exchange security for economic 
or political benefits, the concrete method by which these benefits are delivered is 
unexplored. In addition, the literature fails to explore that small states may deliver 
security benefits in narrow ways, such as base access or intelligence cooperation, that 
may provide benefits of greater value to the larger state than expected given the 
partner’s relatively limited capabilities. Finally, the literature views reputation as an 





shaped over the long run. However, the experience of the National Security Council 
during changes in administrations suggests that a fresh impression can be made by 
states in the short run. 
 
To help address these gaps in the literature, the study first selected the 14 partnerships 
the US has with Major Non NATO Allies. While broad based studies on alliances exist, 
these typically fail to exclusively examine asymmetric alliances. Furthermore, these 
broad studies also complicate their examination by failing to control a range of variables 
including by examining the alliances formed by many security-providing states, 
examining alliances which were formed in centuries past, and examining alliances in 
which the depth of benefits exchanged varies tremendously. By contrast, all of the 
MNNAs have all been selected since 1989, share the same large-state partner, and 
provides small states with access to the same suite of benefits. These attributes increases 
the study’s potential utility for US policymakers examining future potential partners. 
 
With the relationships under examination selected, I proceeded to select proxy measures 
by which to study potential avenues that a small state could deliver political or 
economic benefits. For both economic and political benefits, the literature failed to 
address this question. Therefore, I selected proxies that cover a range of benefits within 






To gauge the delivery of political benefits, I examined both UN voting data and 
compliance with economic sanctions. The proxy measure using voting data provided 
insight into a broad and symbolic avenue for a state to provide the US with political 
benefits. The second proxy measure studied the economic relations with states under US 
unilateral sanctions. States under unilateral US sanctions are clearly a concern for the 
US. By reducing their economic interaction with these States, potential partners can 
provide political benefits to the US by voluntarily assisting the sanctions efforts. Unlike 
UN Voting, reducing one’s interaction with a state facing unilateral US sanctions is a 
tangible cost incurred that assists US foreign policy efforts in a narrow, tailored way. 
 
To gauge the delivery of economic benefits, I examined data on the trade relationship 
and arms sales between the US and its partners. The first proxy measure I used in this 
theme leveraged the trade data to analyze the state of the relationship overtime. The 
proxy provides insight into the broader economic links with increasing US exports a 
sign of increasing US benefit from the relationship. The second proxy, based on arms 
trade data, provides a narrower view of benefit deliver. Governments are often the 
exclusive purchasers of military equipment and have direct control over who they 
purchase arms from.  
 
With these proxies selected, the paper proceeded to analyze the data temporally. This 
was done in order to address the gaps in the literature. First, if security benefits are 





are several possible timing sequences including a large state first delivering security 
benefits, first a small state delivering political/economic benefits first or concurrent 
delivery. The second gap is in understanding whether small states, in seeking to 
maximize their gains from the relationship, take advantage of a large state’s networked 
reputation risk and underperform on benefit delivery.  
 
To examine how the MNNA’s behaved in the real world, I constructed averages for 
three separate time periods surrounding an MNNA’s designation year. The first time 
period examines the behavior of a state 6-10 years prior to the MNNA’s designation. 
With the MNNA designation being an executive branch action and the average US 
presidency lasting just over 5 years, the first time period acts as a baseline for MNNA 
behavior. The second time period includes the five years prior to a designation and 
could be a time period in which an MNNA could start to deliver benefits to boost its 
chances of gaining security benefits. The paper examines if the behavior during the 
second time period keeps on the same course as the baseline or significantly changes. 
The third time period includes the five years after the designation. This time period can 
be compared to the second time period to see if there is a shift in behavior following the 
designation.  
 
An increase in benefit delivery would follow the literature’s expectations. A decrease in 
benefit deliver suggests that small states are leveraging the asymmetrical importance of 





behavior would suggest that economic and political benefits are not the medium of 
exchange. This third outcome could take place in a scenario where a small state and 
large state exchange complimentary security benefits. 
 
My analysis of the proxy measures revealed that MNNAs behave in a variety of ways. 
The Argentine case appears to be a model for a state seeking to gain security benefits by 
delivering political and economic benefits first before curtailing them. The UN Voting 
record was particularly revealing with a large increase in affinity levels for US positions 
from the 1st to the 2nd measure. However, once the designation took place, there was a 
large drop off in cooperation. The other cases, however, did not show the same drastic 
shifts as the Argentine case. 
 
With this information, the paper proceeded to apply these insights into analyzing future 
potential partners. Through a geospatial analysis of commercial satellite imagery, the 
threat posed by China’s activities in the South China Sea is discussed while an analysis 
of search trends suggests that the US Government is increasingly engaged on the topic. 
These two factors could form the basis for a long run interest in countering Chinese 
actions in the South China Sea and in turn open the possibility to new alliances.  
 
A review of press reporting suggests that India is a sought after partner in the area by 
the US. Using the insights gained from the above review, I examined the most recently 





also reviewed press reporting, policy documents, and academic literature on India to 
provide context for its behavior.  
 
My review of the literature suggested that India increasingly viewed Chinese naval 
activity in the region as troubling but that India has traditionally resisted becoming 
entangled in alliances. This position seems to have started to evolve given its deepening 
relationship with the US military and other US partners in the region including 
Singapore, Australia, and Japan. The data, meanwhile, showed that the most significant 
shift was in arms sales. In this category, there was a significant deepening of the 
relationship with the US now providing offensive weapon systems rather than defensive 
ones. Overall, however, the US pursuit of an Indian relationship seems to not be based 
on Indian provision of economic or political benefits. Indeed, given the strength of the 
Chinese challenge, symbolic gestures at the UN are of lesser interest. Instead, India’s 
geographic location astride key Chinese energy supply routes, the size of its population, 
and its growing ability to project force in the region are more important factors. 
 
Areas Not Addressed 
 
My research, while providing some new insights into asymmetric alliances, was not 
designed to address all the shortcomings on the literature. First, the study cannot 
provide insight into the role that internal foreign policy priorities have on alliance 





relatively limited foreign policy portfolio which allows senior policymakers the freedom 
to concentrate on a few core issues. Such a state, therefore, has the opportunity to focus 
on maximizing the returns from an alliance. Major power policymakers, by contrast, 
have expansive foreign policy portfolios. As such, policymakers maintaining multiple 
partnerships have limited mental bandwidth to devote to maximizing the return from 
each partner. To date, the literature has yet to directly address if the greater return on 
investment accrues to the state which places the most importance on the relationship.  
 
Second, my research was not designed to explore the relative leverage of states within 
asymmetric alliances overtime. A minor power seeking security from a major power has 
a stronger incentive to develop a relationship than the major power. This is because the 
survival of the state is at stake for the minor power while the major power only gains 
additional political or economic autonomy. As a result, the major power likely will have 
a high degree of leverage over the minor power when establishing a relationship. Yet 
after an agreement is formalized, does the relative leverage change?  
 
The literature suggests that there could be an impact. The major state now has now put 
at risk its reputation upon which it’s other relationships rest. The abandonment of one 
ally could degrade the major power’s reputation in the eyes of other partners. Whether 
this creates space for the minor power to under deliver on its commitments has yet to be 
directly explored.  Again, I made an explicit assumption in my hypothesis that a large 





delivery. However, the design of the research was not intended to address this area 
directly. 
 
Finally, the paper only examined alliances at the state level of analysis. At this level, the 
proxy measures did not generally capture the behavior expected by the literature. One 
explanation is that the proxy measures were unsuitable to capture the behavior which 
took place due to the level of analysis. Each proxy measure used was generated through 
large datasets which capture state behavior at a macro level.  
 
Examining the issue from the individual leadership level would likely result in the 
construction of different proxy measures. In turn, it is possible that these proxy 
measures could reveal the behavior expected by the literature. At the national level of 
analysis, Japan failed to deliver economic benefits to the US as there was a huge growth 
in the trade deficit during the time period. However, if examined at the leadership level, 
narrow economic benefits which benefited the Administration’s domestic standing 
could have been sufficient. In the Japanese case, the voluntary agreement to restrict 
exports of automobiles to the US allowed the Administration to appear supportive of 
American manufacturing even if overall trade indictors increasingly were not in favor of 
the US. 
 






In addition to the aspects left undressed by this study, future areas of research should 
focus on clarifying the state behavior demonstrated in the study. First, one area for 
future research is whether the lessons learned from studying MNNAs apply to 
asymmetric more broadly. The use of MNNAs as a target for study was useful in that 
each dyad contains the same larger partner, MNNAs are each provided access to the 
same benefits, and the cases are recent, potentially increasing the value of their 
examination to the identification of potential future partners for the United States. At the 
same time, however, the recentness of MNNAs is also a limiting factor. The examination 
of historic cases of asymmetric alliance formation would allow for a review of internal 
policy documents following their declassification, providing a view inside the black box 
of policy rather than simply examining the products of the black box (i.e. UN Voting 
records, economic data, etc.). 
 
A more detailed review of the Israeli and Argentine cases could provide additional 
insights. What were the primary motivations of the principal actors at the time of the 
alliance declaration? Did their behavior change purposefully to align with the United 
States or by coincidence? What was the nature of the negotiations prior to the 
declarations? Where the benefits of the MNNA declaration abnormally large for these 
select states compared to the other MNNA designees? The construction of a thorough 
case study involving these three MNNAs would hopefully address these lingering 
questions on whether states deliberately attempt to enhance their reputations by 






The final area where additional research is required is to confirm whether security 
provision by small states can truly provide the basis for an alliance between a large state 
and a small state. One finding of my research is that a select group of states provided 
neither enhanced political nor trade benefits to the United States yet were still selected 
as partners. This suggests that alternative methods may have been used to illustrate a 
sufficient degree of reliability to the United States in the run up to the declaration. By 
exploring data focusing on the security spheres such military cooperation in the form of 
training and military exercises or intelligence cooperation in the form of extradition 
reform, joint integrations, and information sharing, future research can shed light on the 




This study has helped address some of the important gaps in the academic literature on 
asymmetric alliances. By examining the actual behavior of states in the real world, the 
study suggests that asymmetric benefit exchanges occur infrequently and are far from 
the default foundation of these alliances. Instead, it appears that other factors, such as 
narrow security benefits, provided the foundation for majority of MNNAs and, by 
implication, could provide the foundation for many other cases of asymmetric alliances. 
Finally, the results of this study suggests that as the United States confronts new 





gestures such as cooperation at the UN but rather by tangible benefits such as arms sales 

















% change Avg Post % change 
Australia 0.725931919 0.4772993 -
0.3425013 
0.5145599 0.0780655 
Egypt 0.308544286 0.1464846 -
0.5252396 
0.2373506 0.6203111 
Israel 0.902919906 0.8574682 -
0.0503386 
0.9212327 0.0743637 
Japan 0.733447587 0.5542243 -
0.2443573 
0.5700286 0.0285161 
South Korea     #DIV/0! 
Jordan 0.142710051 0.2348204 0.6454373 0.2107424 -0.102538 
New Zealand 0.376147652 0.5214053 0.3861719 0.469037 -
0.1004368 
Argentina 0.223606131 0.5492655 1.4563973 0.2980065 -
0.4574455 








Thailand 0.291244745 0.2274198 -
0.2191453 
0.1072162 -0.528554 












Afghanistan 0.136057491 0.1670307 0.2276481   
India 0.111347559 0.1708333 0.5342351   
 
Data derived from Anton Strezhnev and Erik Voeten, "United Nations General 






Appendix B: UN Voting Data (Weighted) 
 
Country Weighted Avg  
Baseline 





Avg Post  
% Change 
Pre to Post 
Australia 0.390084127 0.2707142 -
0.3060108 
0.1838992 -0.3206885 
Egypt -0.027303506 -0.0601005 -1.201202 -0.09331 0.5525657 
Israel 0.567072114 0.6508831 0.1477959 0.5905721 -0.0926603 





    #DIV/0! 








Argentina -0.00953939 0.1425099 15.939102 0.0050351 -0.9646684 
Bahrain -0.107807223 -0.104852 0.0274118 -0.1169176 0.1150726 
Philippines -0.11800137 -0.0995803 0.156109 -0.0889345 -0.1069066 
Thailand -0.115510826 -0.085968 0.2557577 -0.0848727 -0.0127418 
Kuwait -0.063172243 -0.0937628 -0.48424 -0.1213464 0.2941852 
Morocco -0.084490767 -0.113504 -
0.3433893 
-0.0970043 -0.1453666 
Pakistan -0.138992938 -0.1263977 0.0906181 -0.112965 -0.1062726 
Afghanistan -0.080146129 -0.0901575 -
0.1249137 
  




Data derived from Anton Strezhnev and Erik Voeten, "United Nations General 






Appendix C: Sanctions Compliance Prior to the MNNA Designation (Exports) 
 
Country Number of Dyads with 
Increasing Trade 
Number of Dyads with 
Decreasing Trade 
Australia 5/12=.58 42 
Egypt 6/9=.67 0.33 
Israel 1/5=.20 0.8 
Japan 8/13=.62 0.38 
South Korea 7/10=.7 0.3 
Jordan 5/10=.5 0.5 
New Zealand 8/15=.53 0.47 
Argentina 11/17=.65 0.35 
Bahrain 4/12=.33 0.67 
Philippines 6/10=.6 0.4 
Thailand 6/10=.6 0.4 
Kuwait 4/5=.8 0.2 
Morocco 4/9=.44 0.56 
Pakistan 6/9=.67 0.33 
 
Total # of Dyads Examined: 146 
Total # of Dyads With Increases: 81 
Percentage of Dyads with Increases: 106/153=55% 
 
Data derived from Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk, “Correlates of War Project 
Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0,” 2012 and Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. “Summary of Economic Sanctions Episodes, 1916-2006.” Accessed 








Appendix D: Sanctions Compliance after the MNNA Designation (Exports) 
 
Country Number of Dyads with 
Increasing Trade 
Number of Dyads with 
Decreasing Trade 
Australia 5 of 10=.5 0.5 
Egypt 7 of 10=.7 0.3 
Israel 3 of 10=.3 0.7 
Japan 5 of 10=.5 0.5 
South Korea 8 of 10=.8 0.2 
Jordan 7 of 11=.64 0.36 
New Zealand 08 of 11=.73 0.27 
Argentina 6 of 10=.6 0.4 
Bahrain 3 of 7=.86 0.14 
Philippines 8 of 10=.8 0.2 
Thailand 10 of 10=.1 0 
Kuwait 6 of 9=.67 0.33 
Morocco 6 of 9=.67 0.33 
Pakistan 8 of 9=.89 0.11 
 
Total # of Dyads Examined: 136 
Total # of Dyads With Increases: 94 
Percentage of Dyads with Increases: 94/136=69% 
 
Data derived from Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk, “Correlates of War Project 
Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0,” 2012 and Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. “Summary of Economic Sanctions Episodes, 1916-2006.” Accessed 







Appendix E: Sanctions Compliance Prior to the MNNA Designation (Imports) 
 
Country Number of Dyads 
with Increasing Trade 
Number of Dyads with Decreasing 
Trade 
Australia 8/12=.67 0.33 
Egypt 6/11=.55 0.45 
Israel 2/7=.29 0.71 
Japan 9/13=0.69 0.31 
South Korea 4/10=.4 0.6 
Jordan 13/15=.87 0.13 
New Zealand 11/14=.78 0.22 
Argentina 13/17=.76 0.24 
Bahrain 9/11=.82 0.18 
Philippines 4/11=.36 0.64 
Thailand 7/9=.77 0.23 
Kuwait 6/8=.75 0.25 
Morocco 5/9=.55 0.45 
Pakistan 6/9=.66 0.34 
 
Total # of Dyads Examined: 153 
Total # of Dyads With Increases: 106 
Percentage of Dyads with Increases: 86/136=69% 
 
Data derived from Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk, “Correlates of War Project 
Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0,” 2012 and Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. “Summary of Economic Sanctions Episodes, 1916-2006.” Accessed 







Appendix F: Sanctions Compliance after the MNNA Designation (Imports) 
 
Country Number of Dyads with 
Increasing Trade 
Number of Dyads with 
Decreasing Trade 
Australia 6 of 10=.6 0.4 
Egypt 7 of 10=.7 0.3 
Israel 3 of 10=.3 0.7 
Japan 7 of 10=.7 0.3 
South Korea 8 of 10=.8 0.2 
Jordan 7 of 11=.64 0.36 
New Zealand 05 of 11=.45 0.55 
Argentina 4 of 10=.4 0.6 
Bahrain 6 of 7=.86 0.14 
Philippines 4 of 10=.4 0.7 
Thailand 7 of 10=.7 0.3 
Kuwait 7 of 9=.78 0.22 
Morocco 6 of 9=.67 0.33 
Pakistan 9 of 9=1 0 
 
Total # of Dyads Examined: 136 
Total # of Dyads With Increases: 86 
Percentage of Dyads with Increases: 86/136=63% 
 
Data derived from Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk, “Correlates of War Project 
Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0,” 2012 and Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. “Summary of Economic Sanctions Episodes, 1916-2006.” Accessed 








Appendix G: Sanctions Compliance Prior to the MNNA Designation (Total 
Trade) 
 
Country Number of Dyads with 
Increasing Trade 
Number of Dyads with 
Decreasing Trade 
Australia 6/12=.5 0.5 
Egypt 8/13=.62 0.38 
Israel 3/8=.375 0.625 








Argentina 12/17=.71 0.29 
Bahrain 9/12=.75 0.25 
Philippines 7/11=.64 0.36 
Thailand 7/11=.64 0.36 
Kuwait 7/8=.875 0.125 
Morocco 3/9=.33 0.67 
Pakistan 6/10=.6 0.4 
   
Total # of Dyads Examined: 167 
 
Total # of Dyads With Increases: 106 
 
Percentage of Dyads with Increases:106/167: 63% 
 
Data derived from Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk, “Correlates of War Project 
Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0,” 2012 and Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. “Summary of Economic Sanctions Episodes, 1916-2006.” Accessed 





Appendix H: Sanctions Compliance after the MNNA Designation (Total Trade) 
 
Country Number of Dyads 
with Increasing 
Trade 
Number of Dyads with 
Decreasing Trade 
Australia 5 of 10 =.5 0.5 
Egypt 7 of 10 =.7 0.3 
Israel 3 of 10=.3 0.7 
Japan 5 of 10 = .5 0.5 
South Korea 8 of 10= .8 0.2 
Jordan 5 of 11=.45 0.55 
New Zealand 7 of 11=.64 0.36 
Argentina 8 of 10=.8 0.2 
Bahrain 7 of 7 =1 0 
Philippines 6 of 10=.6 0.4 
Thailand 10 of 10=1 0 
Kuwait 8 of 9=.89 0.11 
Morocco 6 of 9 = .67 0.33 
Pakistan 9 of 9 =1 0 
 
Total # of Dyads Examined: 136 
 
Total # of Dyads With Increases: 94 
 
Percentage of Dyads with Increases:94/136: 69% 
 
Data derived from Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk, “Correlates of War Project 
Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0,” 2012 and Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. “Summary of Economic Sanctions Episodes, 1916-2006.” Accessed 









































































































6.35377 -1151.97    
India 34723.77 54280
.7 






Data derived from Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk, “Correlates of War Project 









































































































































India  -8804.89 -
8948.
82 
0.016346 -0.19963    
 
Data derived from Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk, “Correlates of War Project 















% Change from 
Baseline to Pre 
Avg 
Post 
% Change from Pre 
to Post 
Australia 271.8 608 1.236939 286.6 -0.52862 
Egypt 822.2 675 -0.17903 1017 0.506667 
Israel 973.2 686.
8 
-0.29429 829.8 0.208212 
Japan 1229.4 183
8.4 
0.495364 2180.4 0.186031 
South Korea 820.6 748.
8 










-0.31852 23.75 2.097826 
Argentina 9.4 37.8 3.021277 57.4 0.518519 
Bahrain 68.75 97.7
5 
0.421818 23.5 -0.75959 
Philippines 19 15 -0.21053 11.6 -0.22667 
Thailand 266 54.4 -0.79549 24.333
33 
-0.5527 
Kuwait 351.4 13 -0.96301 96.666
67 
6.435897 
Morocco 93.33333 6 -0.93571 11.5 0.916667 
Pakistan 79.2 14 -0.82323 202.4 13.45714 
Afghanistan 19 231.
4 
11.17895   
India 44.4 102
9 






Data derived from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms 


















% change from 




% change from 
Pre to Post 
Australi
a 
0.738535 0.910998 0.233521 0.875382 -0.0391 
Egypt 0.558106 0.551139 -0.01248 0.874012 0.585827 
Israel 0.756677 0.992199 0.311259 0.997116 0.004956 
Japan 0.953628 0.939013 -0.01533 0.959176 0.021473 
South 
Korea 
0.965702 0.908077 -0.05967 0.753907 -0.16978 
Jordan 0.054572 0.531915 8.746981 0.55102 0.035918 
New 
Zealand 
0.276074 0.190083 -0.31148 0.251989 0.325683 
Argenti
na 
0.170909 0.455422 1.664701 0.558366 0.226041 
Bahrain 0.887097 0.933174 0.051942 0.559524 -0.40041 
Philippi
nes 
0.366795 0.56962 0.552965 0.597938 0.049714 
Thailan
d 
0.447661 0.458685 0.024626 0.292 -0.3634 
Kuwait 0.733918 0.043624 -0.94056 0.90625 19.77404 
Morocco 0.655914 0.031414 -0.95211 0.09434 2.003145 
Pakistan 0.111707 0.019492 -0.8255 0.344864 16.69216 
Afghani
stan 
0.228916 0.663798 1.899749   
India 0.020993 0.097136 3.627084   
 
Data derived from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms 
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